European Parliament

Mapping threats to peace and democracy worldwide

Normandy Index 2025

STUDY

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In the context of the wars in Ukraine and other parts of the world, the increasingly global effects – material and political – of war make it more important than ever to measure the level of threats to peace, security and democracy around the world. The Normandy Index has presented an annual measurement of these threats since the 2019 Normandy Peace Forum. The results of the 2025 exercise suggest the level of threats to peace is at its highest since the index began, confirming declining trends in global security resulting from conflict, geopolitical rivalry, growing militarisation and hybrid threats. The findings of the 2025 exercise draw on data compiled in 2024 and 2025 to compare peace – defined on the basis of a given country's performance against a range of predetermined threats – across countries and regions. Derived from the Index, 63 individual country case studies provide a picture of the state of peace in the world today.

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Foreword

Established by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) following the Normandy Peace Forum in 2019, the Normandy Peace Index has quickly become an important resource for policy-makers and civil society as an annual measurement of threats to peace globally. The results of this latest Index suggest that the threat level is at its highest yet, reflecting wider trends in worsening security levels worldwide due to conflict, geopolitical rivalry, growing militarisation, trade wars and hybrid threats. At the same time, shifts towards protectionism represent a profound threat to global peace, stability and prosperity, as the interdependent relationships built through open trade slowly unravel.

In our interconnected world, we know that conflict is rarely confined to the geographical area in which it takes place. Wars nowadays have increasingly global human, material and political effects that reverberate across continents and shape the international order. We see this in Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine, which has intensified many global trends, from inflation to environmental degradation. In order to track these changes, a clear understanding of the threats to peace, security and democracy around the world is crucial. This makes the Normandy Index a valuable tool for navigating today's world, and I want to thank the European Parliamentary Research Service for its hard work on this latest edition.

The European Union has sought to respond to this complex global situation with unity and determination both at home and abroad – and the European Parliament is leading the way. This Parliament was the first to call for increased sanctions on Russia and for an end to Europe's dependence on Russian energy, whilst also approving unprecedented levels of assistance to Ukrainians in need. Meanwhile, Europe has continued to strengthen cooperation with international partners to mitigate global disruptions in energy and food markets triggered by the Russian aggression. However, we know that ultimately Europe is always stronger when we work together: that is why this Parliament has been supportive of Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkans on their paths to accession to our Union.

On the global stage, the European Union continues to advocate an end to current conflicts through diplomacy and cooperation, working with like-minded partners to achieve maximum impact. In Gaza, Parliament has consistently and loudly called for an end to the brutal cycle of war launched by Hamas on 7 October 2023, and remains a reliable and supportive partner to all those in the region who wish to build peace. At the same time, Europe is delivering aid to people in desperate need in war zones and humanitarian crises across the world in our role as the world's largest humanitarian donor.

It is important to consider the lessons of Europe's past when looking to our continent's future. This year's edition of the index coincides with the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Europe. The immense devastation and human loss of that conflict serve as a solemn reminder of the cost of war, the value of peace and the enduring responsibility of current and future generations to preserve and strengthen the foundations of international cooperation. Just five years later, in the rubble of this conflict, the Schuman Declaration established what would ultimately become the European Union. It was a brave and ambitious vision of peace and partnership, and today's Union must work towards a more peaceful world with that same courage and conviction. In the words of Robert Schuman, the author of that declaration: 'World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it'.

Roberta Metsola

President of the European Parliament

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1. Pursuing peace in a more connected, contested and complex world

The European Union's foreign and security policy has long been the subject of varied and contested academic debate – on subjects ranging from the Union's capacity and legitimacy to act, to its need for a strategy, vision and objectives. The first European security strategy of 2003 presented by the then High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP), Javier Solana, attempted to define the scope of the EU's foreign and security policy, key challenges and threats, such as terrorism, energy insecurity and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but without clear operational elements.[1] In response, in part, to some of those questions, the 2016 Global Strategy launched by the then HR/VP, Federica Mogherini,[2] set out a structured and coherent vision for European Union (EU) foreign and security policy in an increasingly complex geopolitical and socio-economic global environment. Building on the provisions of the founding Treaties of the EU – and more specifically the Treaty of Lisbon – the Global Strategy raises the EU's level of ambition as a foreign policy actor in pursuit of the objectives defined in the Treaty. Key among those is the pursuit of peace, both in the EU and globally.

While the Global Strategy is not a classic threat assessment exercise, its approach captures a number of threats to global peace and security, and goes beyond the traditional understanding of security by including in those threats traditional and emerging issues that challenge peace. It also draws on the crucial links between developments with the potential to exacerbate, catalyse and magnify the threats identified.

In 2020, the EU's 27 Member States (EU-27) undertook the challenge of carrying out the first ever independent joint analysis of the full range of threats and challenges the EU currently faces or might face in the near future, as the first part of the two-year Strategic Compass process. The Compass, which was endorsed by the European Council in March 2022,[3] aims to guide the EU's strategic culture. It sets out an ambitious plan of action with concrete deliverables, aimed at strengthening the EU's security and defence policy by 2030. The Compass's presentation of threats is formulated in four sections: the first describes the return of power politics and the contested multipolar world; the second identifies threats and challenges linked to specific geographical focal points in the world – from China to Latin America; the third lays out emerging and transnational threats; and the fourth and final part concludes with the strategic implications for the EU. Interestingly, the third part, whose substance looks specifically at the types of threats, coincides largely with the categories identified in the Global Strategy, while adding emphasis on emerging and disruptive technologies, health, maritime and space as domains of pronounced threat. It also identifies the weaponisation of natural resources as a threat. As the Global Strategy before it, the threat analysis carried out in the Strategic Compass highlights the interconnectedness of threats and the hybridity of the threat environment. An update of the common threat analysis was carried out in December 2022, to adapt it to the changing strategic and security context, including the global consequences of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. In the coming

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[1]   European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Council, 2009.

[2]   A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, EEAS, November 2016.

[3]   A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, Council of the European Union, March 2022.

years, the Strategic Compass envisages regular updates with the support of a reinforced single intelligence analysis capacity.[4]

Following the logic of the interconnectedness of threats, the Normandy Index, a product of a 2018 memorandum of understanding between the Region of Normandy and the European Parliament, aims to provide a holistic picture of the world (regions and countries) through the prism of the pursuit of peace, measured against threats explicitly defined in the Global Strategy. Its objective is to provide a tool to help EU policy-makers design targeted external action instruments. It is deliberately framed to be concise and easy to understand, to serve as a tool for Members to communicate with the wider public – in terms of both understanding threats across the world and providing information about EU external action.

1.1. Measuring peace

The modern definition of peace refers not only to an absence of war, but also includes elements of wellbeing, social order and justice for individual persons, as people demand and expect more from peace.[5] Peace also encompasses the right to bodily integrity and rights pertaining to moral and cultural values. All humans have the right to life and the right to the means necessary for their development. This positive dimension of peace is difficult to measure as it is a continuum, stretching from inter-state war to positive public perceptions. This continuum includes international violence (i.e. wars, hybrid conflicts) and intra-national violence (i.e. gang or police violence, forced displacements and civil wars).[6] Therefore, any measure of peace has to take numerous dimensions into account. A 2022 report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) argues that a systems-thinking understanding of peace is needed to understand fundamental issues related to peacebuilding, including what version of peace is being built and how to make it sustainable.[7] The same paper also posits that 'because of the complexity, mixed methods approaches that use both qualitative and quantitative data, as well as triangulation from multiple sources are important parts of the evidence base for measuring peace impact'.

Another way to measure peace is to consider the level of threats to peace, in order to address them and avoid possible deterioration. Indeed, several states are faced with multiple threats that not only affect peace individually but could also join up to create new challenges – and hybrid threats. Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and recent tensions in Iran and Venezuela, have all led to increased energy insecurity. Furthermore, political decisions and geopolitics are also affecting global trade, as demonstrated by the 2022 peak in the KPMG Supply Chain Stability Index[8] or the decision by US President Donald Trump to introduce a 'reciprocal tariff' in April 2025.[9] Finally, WMD proliferation and nuclear testing re-emerged as a threat to peace in October 2025, when Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the testing of a new, nuclear-powered cruise missile and a nuclear-powered, autonomous torpedo. Responding to this challenge, President Trump ordered the resumption of nuclear arms testing, reversing a previous decision

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[4]   Annual Progress Report on the Implementation of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, EEAS, March 2023.

[5]   Declaration on a Culture of Peace adopted at the UN General Assembly, 107th plenary, United Nations Digital Library, 1999.

[6]   M. Caparini, G. Milante, Sustaining peace and sustainable development in dangerous places, SIPRI, 2017.

[7]   E. Brusset, G. Milante, M. Riquier, C. Delgado, Measuring Peace Impact, SIPRI, 2022.

[8]   KPMG Supply Chain Stability Index, KPMG, 2025.

[9]   Executive Order 14257, Regulating imports with a reciprocal tariff to rectify trade practices that contribute to large and persistent annual United States goods trade deficits, 2 April 2025.

by President George Bush on a US testing moratorium in 1992.[10] The Soviet Union last tested nuclear weapons in 1990, and China in 1996.

Recognising the interconnectedness of threats, the rationale behind the Normandy Index is twofold. First, the index focuses on EU external action by selecting and measuring the threats perceived by the EU, which it aims to tackle, prevent, resolve or address. Second, the Normandy Index aims at monitoring the probability (or existence) of conflict (or destabilisation of peace and security) in a given country on the basis of the aggregate level of these threats.

1.2. Identifying threats and shaping policy: Indices and policy-making

Indices can be used as early-warning systems and are designed to give policy-makers insights into potential risks and developments in economic, social, environmental, security and political factors. Quantitative indices are also good tools for aggregation and comparison purposes, as well as demonstrating change, evolution and the degree of that evolution in a standardised manner. Depending on their make-up, indices can quantify possibilities of an event occurring in the near/foreseeable future, thus acting as foresight tools. Foresight, as defined in the Global Trends to 2030 report from the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS) is 'an intellectual exercise where we imagine different alternatives of the future ... tracing how we end up there'.[11] In that sense, foresight is a tool to help determine and choose a path for action; it is 'an organising yet selective principle'. Part of the European Commission's stated rationale for embedding strategic foresight into policy-making is 'to build and use collective intelligence to anticipate developments and prepare for new opportunities and challenges earlier and more effectively'.[12] Composite indicators (or indices) can bring together this collective intelligence to provide policy-makers with 'the big picture', crucial in shaping policy.

An index can also offer a comprehensive overview of a situation made up of a basket of contributing factors. Existing indices relating to peace and security present differing versions of such baskets, taking selected variables into account to build their measurements of conflict and peace. Some function as conflict trackers, focusing specifically on the prevention of deadly violence and its relevance for a region's or country's foreign policy.[13] Others aim to be broadly informative about the levels of a multitude of factors, such as societal safety and security, domestic and international conflict and degree of militarisation. A third category, which incorporates the Fragile States Index (FSI) ranking, highlights areas of vulnerability contributing to the risk of state fragility. Energy insecurity could be measured by electricity consumption per capita and net energy imports. As gross domestic product (GDP) is energy transformed into goods and services, energy insecurity augurs lukewarm economic development or stagnation, and this trend will become more pronounced with the deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure.

We can already measure the downtrend in the Russian energy industry that has intensified in 2024 and 2025, due to international sanctions and Ukraine attacks on refineries, affecting exports. In

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[10] H. Williams, L. MacKenzie, Russia's Latest Nuclear Saber-Rattling: Nuclear Testing?, Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2025.

[11] Global Trends to 2030, European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS), April 2019.

[12] Strategic Foresight Report, European Commission, September 2020.

[13] Global Conflict Tracker, Council on Foreign Relations, 2023.

September 2025, Russia's monthly fossil fuel export revenues saw a 4 % month-on-month decline to €546 million per day – the lowest they have been since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Around 70 % of Russia's seaborne oil exports are now affected by US restrictions. According to the International Energy Agency, Russia's revenues from exports of crude oil and refined products fell in September (−26 %), October (−27 %) and again in November (−32.7 %) due to lower export volumes and weaker prices. Russia's revenues from crude and fuel export sales fell to US$10.97 billion in November, down US$3.59 billion from the same month a year ago. Urals prices plunged by US$8.2 to US$43.52 per barrel, dragging export revenues to their lowest level since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.[14]

Consequently, as the Bank of Finland notes, 'the latest preliminary budget framework approved by the Russian government suggests a tightening of the government's fiscal stance … [government] spending has risen so fast (up 20 % y-o-y in January-July) that even if the current spending estimate materialises, annual growth in budget expenditure would remain at zero for the rest of the year – increasing the risk that the Russian economy sinks into recession'.[15] In contrast, North America's liquefied natural gas (LNG) export capacity could more than double by 2029.[16]

The limits to policy implementation are naturally marked in terms of resources, time and politics. Yet, even in hindsight, indices can provide an understanding of the elements that contributed to a policy response's adequacy to face critical events. Overall, these datasets and indicators aim to measure the comparative level of pre-defined variables across a region or the world; to make political risk assessments for the future; and to contribute to the work of policy-makers and other foreign policy actors. The vision of the Normandy Index is to perform these functions in the service of EU foreign policy, in a way that is consistent with its objectives and aims. This is particularly timely, given new challenges and opportunities, such as requests by Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to become EU members, and consequent designation of new candidate and pre-candidate countries in June 2022. Parliament's President Roberta Metsola has remarked that 'enlargement is the Union's strongest geopolitical tool. And especially in this new geostrategic environment, an enlarged EU that is based on clear objectives, criteria and merit, serves as an investment in peace, security, stability and prosperity on the European continent. It is a process with an outcome that benefits everyone involved'. In addition, knowledge of geopolitical and economic threats affecting the countries in the EU's immediate neighbourhood provides additional information for decision-makers, and can facilitate European integration of these countries and further cooperation with southern and eastern neighbours. Beyond the European Neighbourhood, the Normandy Index provides a clear and strategic vision of global policy developments, using cross-cutting geographic and sectoral approaches.

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[14] IEA Oil Market Report (OMR), International Energy Agency, 11 December 2025.

[15] H. Simola, Russian budget framework for 2026-2028 foresees tax hikes and lots of red ink, Bank of Finland Bulletin, Bank of Finland, October 2025.

[16] US Energy Information Administration, October 2025.

2. The Normandy Index

The Normandy Index differs from other indices in that it adopts an approach tailored by and to EU action. It also defines conflict and the numerous stages between perfect peace and total war as a product of factors linked to the main threats identified by the EU in its external action strategy. The EU Global Strategy identifies the following 11 threats as the current main challenges to peace and security.[17]

terrorism	hybrid threats	economic crises	climate change
energy insecurity	violent conflicts	cybersecurity	disinformation
fragile states	trans-border crime	weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)	

The index uses 9 of these 11 threats as factors assigned equal weight in the final result for 138 United Nations (UN) countries (with the EU-27 counted as one entity). A major innovation is to blend geopolitical indicators with economic and social data. Trends towards inflation, trade, energy disruption and weaker economies, underway since 2021, continued in 2025. Global GDP growth slowed in 2022 to 3.2 %, more than 1 percentage point less than expected at the end of 2021, mainly weighed down by Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine. Following 2.6 % growth in 2023 and sub-trend global growth of 2.8 % in 2024, global growth is projected to reach 3.2 % in 2025 and 3.1 % in 2026.[18] At the same time, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Kristalina Georgieva, issued a stark warning in October 2025 about the mounting risks facing the global economy, saying 'buckle up: uncertainty is the new normal'.[19]

General government gross debt to GDP has also increased on a long-term trajectory: from 73.2 % in 2013 to 110.2 % in 2025 for advanced economies; emerging and developing economies' debt increased from 49.7 % to 72.4 % (IMF, 2025).[20] 'Public debt is just a deferred tax. It will be paid by future taxpayers, either through an explicit tax increase or by inflation', argues Professor Steve Hanke.[21] Off-budget debt issuance, increased by the Commission following the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's war in Ukraine to almost one trillion euros, could also become a source of instability, as interest rates have risen substantially since 2022. This debt is not included by Eurostat in the EU's general government debt, currently at approximately €14.5 trillion (2024), which is equivalent to 80.7 % of its GDP.[22]

The Normandy Index now encompasses three composite indicators: energy insecurity, economic crisis and crime. On crime, while no solid dataset measuring trans-border crime on a global scale is currently available, the criminality level in the 138 entities measured is assessed by a component indicator

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[17] Note that these same threats are also included in the 2022 Strategic Compass threat analysis, with only one difference: the indicator 'trans-border crime' is labelled as 'organised crime'.

[18] Global Economy in Flux, Prospects Remain Dim. World Economic Outlook, IMF, October 2025.

[19] IMF chief warns 'uncertainty is the new normal' in global economy, The Guardian, 8 October 2025. See also Annual Meetings 2025 Wrap-up: IMF and World Bank declare uncertainty the 'new normal' amid spectacle showcasing US and private capital interests, Bretton Woods Project, 21 October 2025.

[20] General government gross debt, IMF, October 2025.

[21] S. Hanke, M. Sekerke, Making Money Work: How to Rewrite the Rules of Our Financial System, Wiley, 2025.

[22] G. Claeys, C. McCaffrey and L. Welslau, The rising cost of European Union borrowing and what to do about it, Bruegel, May 2023.

consisting of a global measurement of organised crime: the number of homicides (75 % of the composite indicator) and an indicator on perceptions of criminality (25 %).

The hybrid threats category is excluded from the Normandy Index, as hybrid threats are, by their very nature, multi-faceted and comprise a combination of factors (see Figure 1). The index therefore assesses hybrid threats indirectly by examining the accumulation of their various dimensions (energy insecurity, economic crises, disinformation, cyber-attacks). In its online version, the Normandy Index allows users to view the 138 entities ranked on the basket of threats that together constitute 'hybrid'.[23] Quantifying or even estimating the level of disinformation in a given country remains a contentious issue among specialists, as new knowledge about this field continues to be generated. For this reason, the initial version of the Normandy Index used a measure of 'press freedom' in its place, despite recognising that the media landscape is merely one of many factors affecting resilience to disinformation. Data on the spread of misleading views and false information by governments and political parties have become available through the Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) project. While not exhaustive, the Normandy Index uses data collected by the VDEM to measure the disinformation threat.[24]

Figure 1 – Means of hybrid warfare

Source: Center for European Policy Analysis, 2021.

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[23] Normandy Index, EPRS, European Parliament, 2025.

[24] Note that the 2022 Normandy Index has been retroactively calculated to include new indicators on economic crises (public debt to GDP), as well as a more precise calculation of other indicators, such as energy insecurity (through calculation of annual electric power consumption per capita). For more on the methodological approach, see the annex to this study.

To the above 10 factors, the Normandy Index adds the quality of the democratic process, as democracy support is a core dimension of EU external action. In addition, there is a strong correlation between weak democratic processes and threats to peace and security. Given the complex and multidimensional nature of the domains, the methodology chosen for the Normandy Index is based on a selection of key representative indicator(s) for each domain in line with current academic and policy literature and the available data.

Table 1 – Summary of domains, indicators and sources

Domain	Indicators	Definition	Source	Number of countries covered	Latest year of data
Climate change	INFORM Global Risk Index	INFORM is a global, open–source risk assessment for humanitarian crises and disasters.	United Nations	191	2024
Cybersecurity	Cybersecurity Index	The Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) is a survey measure capturing the commitment of Member States to cybersecurity to raise awareness. It is the only open–source cybersecurity index available.	International Telecommunication Union	193	2024
Democratic processes	Participatory Democracy Index	A measure of the extent to which the ideal of participatory democracy is achieved within a country.	VDEM	178	2024
Economic crises	Financial vulnerability – non-performing loans as % of total loans	Non-performing loans to total gross loans ratio is calculated using the value of non-performing loans (NPLs) as the numerator and the total value of the loan portfolio as the denominator. It is often used as a proxy for asset quality.	World Bank	143	2023
	Central government debt, total (% of GDP)	Central government debt, total (% of GDP).	International Monetary Fund	135	2024
Energy insecurity	Energy imports	Energy imports, net (% of energy use). Banded to be 0 if country is a net exporter of energy.	World Bank	187	2023
	Electric power consumption (kWh per capita)	Electric power consumption (kWh per capita).	World Bank	142	2024
Fragile states	Fragile States Index	The Fragile States Index (FSI) is an annual ranking of 178 countries based on the different pressures they face that impact their levels of fragility. The index is based on the Fund for Peace's proprietary Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) analytical approach. Based on comprehensive social science methodology, three primary streams of data – quantitative, qualitative and expert validation – are triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the FSI.	Fund for Peace	178	2024

Domain	Indicators	Definition	Source	Number of countries covered	Latest year of data
Crime	Homicide rate per 100 000	Homicide rate per 100 000 – used as a proxy for crime.	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)	192	2023
	Perceptions of criminality banded	Responses to the Gallup question: 'Do you feel safe walking alone?'	Gallup	163	2024
Resilience to disinformation	Resilience to disinformation	A measure of how often domestic and foreign governments and political parties use social media and advertising to spread disinformation within the country.	VDEM	177	2024
Terrorism	Global Terrorism Index	A composite score to provide an ordinal ranking of countries on the impact of terrorism. The impact of terrorism includes incidents, deaths, injuries and property damage caused by terrorism.	Institute for Economics and Peace	163	2024
Violent conflict	Conflict sub-indicators of the Global Peace Index	Worst score of the following indicators from the Global Peace Index: (1) Intensity of internal conflict; (2) Deaths from internal conflict; (3) Number of internal conflicts; (4) Intensity of external conflict; (5) Deaths from external conflict.	Institute for Economics and Peace	163	2024
WMD	Nuclear Threat Index	The Nuclear Threat Index assesses countries' progress on nuclear security, highlights security gaps and recommends action for governments to better protect nuclear materials and facilities and build an effective global nuclear security architecture.	Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)	176	2023

Source: Institute for Economics and Peace, EPRS, 2025.

The Normandy Index is therefore a tool EU policy–makers may use to assess countries most at risk in the world according to the EU's Global Strategy, and to direct EU action. It **is not a ranking of countries according to their peacefulness, but rather a ranking of specific threats to peace per country**. As new data become available, the Normandy Index evolves in accuracy, geographical spread and precision. In addition, new armed conflicts or internal political and economic crises may cause security strategists around the world to adapt and develop new policy tools when it comes to security and peace. As events unfold, the Normandy Index will be adjusted as the EU's strategic approach to peace and security evolves, with the potential inclusion of new threats in future versions.

As mentioned earlier, the endorsement of the Strategic Compass and the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Strategic Concept has bolstered European states' security and defence capacity.[25] In April 2023, Finland became NATO's 31st member, while Sweden became the 32nd member on 7 March 2024. However, not all threats can be confronted with military means alone. Beyond classic defence strategies, the EU consistently aims to develop capabilities to promote peace, security and resilience internally and abroad through an array of policies. The pandemic and war in Ukraine have

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[25] NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, NATO, June 2022.

demonstrated that the tools for preserving peace go far beyond the traditional understanding of security. They include, for example, progress towards a European Health Union, REPowerEU – to counter energy insecurity – and the European defence industrial strategy presented in March 2024 to strengthen the European defence technological and industrial base, and achieve defence industrial readiness. The 2023 economic security strategy unveiled by the European Commission in June 2023 also addresses concerns about security and democracy. According to the Commission, the observation that 'risks presented by certain economic linkages are evolving quickly in the current geopolitical and technological environment and are increasingly merging with security concerns' underpins the de-risking spirit of the strategy.

The value of the Normandy Index also lies in its potential to pinpoint the key threats for each country and region it assesses, providing understanding for the policy mix needed to support peace and security in that area. The online version of the Normandy Index offers comparisons across regions, countries and time, enabling EU policy-makers to understand which areas need to be given greater consideration when assisting partners worldwide at national and regional levels, while also potentially monitoring improvement (or absence of improvement) in resilience to those threats in countries where the EU is already engaged.

2.1. The Normandy Index 2025: Findings and functions

For each of the 137 countries and the EU-27, the Normandy Index uses the 11 threats to peace and compares them to the same 11 dimensions for other countries in the same region (or to the world), as the regional environment is assumed to play a major role in countries' resilience to threats. For each dimension, 10 represents no risk and 0 a major threat. In the example shown above (Figure 2), the EU-27 appears less at risk in 10 out of 11 dimensions in 2025, while being more at risk on energy security and at almost equal risk of economic crisis and terrorism as the rest of the world. The comparison between the two years indicates that for the EU-27, as opposed to other countries and regions, there is no significant change in the peace profile between the two years (apart from the economic crisis indicator, which deteriorated in 2025).

Figure 2 – EU–27 Peace profile for 2024 and 2025

Peace profile 2024
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

Source: Normandy Index, 2024 and 2025.

Geopolitical crisis in the European Neighbourhood has affected energy supplies and resulted in a fall in the EU–27 global ranking of 3 places in 2024. In 2025, the EU–27 ranking remains the same as in the previous year (10th globally). After a slight improvement from 2019 to 2022, the global peace profile (5.74 average in 2023-2024) has also declined in the past year to 5.79 – unsurprisingly given current geopolitical tensions. The results of the 2025 exercise suggest that the level of threats to peace in the world is the highest in the seven years since the index began, confirming declining trends in global security resulting from the war in Ukraine, multiple crises and conflicts, geopolitical rivalry, growing militarisation and hybrid threats, including those linked to economic, digital and environmental dimensions.

Figure 3 – Highest and lowest scoring countries in 2025

Top 10 country	rank 2024	rank 2025	rank change		Lowest 10 country	rank 2024	rank 2025	rank change	
Switzerland	1	1	→	0	Haiti	126	129	↓	-3
Iceland	4	2	↑	2	Congo	119	130	↓	-11
Norway	2	2	→	0	South Sudan	131	131	→	0
New Zealand	5	4	↑	1	Yemen	132	132	→	0
Australia	3	5	↓	-2	Mali	129	133	↓	-4
Mauritius	14	6	↑	8	Syria	138	134	↑	4
Canada	6	7	↓	-1	Chad	135	135	→	0
Uruguay	13	8	↑	5	Somalia	133	136	↓	-3
Malaysia	8	9	↓	-1	Afghanistan	137	137	→	0
EU-27	10	10	→	0	Central African Republic	136	138	↓	-2

Data source: Normandy Index, 2024 and 2025.

The launch of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has had an impact on global security and peace: most notably, the global average for energy security has fallen, suggesting that security and energy-related threats have increased. In focusing on the top 10 and lowest 10 scoring countries (Figure 3), it is evident that change is marginal for the highest performers and very slow for lower performers. Countries with the highest score (Switzerland, Iceland, Norway) continue to perform well, advancing in a positive feedback loop year by year. Some are also less affected by global insecurity and threats due to having an advantageous geographic insular position (Australia, Iceland, New Zealand). On the negative side, peace and security in a number of countries, such as Haiti, Congo and Mali, continued to decline in 2025. The three lowest ranked countries (Central African Republic, Afghanistan and Somalia) face multiple negative threats. This indicates that the process of transformation towards peace and security takes place across a longer interval than a single year period, as well as the long impact of negative feedback loops that have tended to nurture a 'global polycrisis'.[26]

Figure 4 – Rising or falling behind? Main changes in the 2025 ranking

Top 10 risers country	rank 2024	rank 2025	rank change		Bottom 10 fallers country	rank 2024	rank 2025	rank change	
Mauritania	87	62	↑	25	Senegal	28	76	↓	-48
Democratic Republic of the Congo	134	109	↑	25	Ecuador	50	85	↓	-35
Montenegro	45	21	↑	24	China	32	62	↓	-30
Saudi Arabia	48	24	↑	24	Cambodia	64	92	↓	-28
Angola	103	81	↑	22	Georgia	30	56	↓	-26
Bolivia	60	39	↑	21	Bangladesh	80	103	↓	-23
Bahrain	58	38	↑	20	Algeria	65	86	↓	-21
Tanzania	76	59	↑	17	Palestine	94	111	↓	-17
Bhutan	49	33	↑	16	Bosnia and Herzegovina	38	54	↓	-16
United States	90	74	↑	16	Russia	108	124	↓	-16

Data source: Normandy Index, 2024 and 2025.

Nevertheless, some countries (Figure 4), such as Mauritania (+25, 62nd), Democratic Republic of the Congo (+25, 109th), Montenegro (+24, 21st) and Saudi Arabia (+24, 24th), signal a positive evolution. The source of a rise in ranking differs for each country and the index should be used to examine this in detail.

[26] Global Risks Report 2024, World Economic Forum, January 2024.

It can sometimes be attributed to peace processes and mediation, or to energy and economic variables, such as increased oil and gas prices for net energy exporters. In other cases, legislation supporting resilience to key threats or improved democracy may boost an individual country's ranking. This observation further justifies the EU's focus on building resilience, internally, in its neighbourhood, and beyond.

Furthermore, several global powers, such as China (–30, 62nd) and the Russian Federation (–16, 124th), fell in the rankings in 2025 due to fragile resilience under adverse conditions and economic uncertainty. The impact of global sanctions and greater internal challenges are increasingly being felt in Russia and its allies as its war against Ukraine continues. The situation in Ukraine seems to be stabilising, with the country moving up 10 places in 2025 to 108th. In 2024, Ukraine fell 5 places, following a big drop in 2023 of 11 places. The war in Ukraine also affects Russia's regional allies: Belarus fell 5 places in 2025 to 95th. The individual factors causing such changes (for example, a significant change in a specific indicator or merely a relative lack of change compared with other countries) can be examined through the component indicators on the Normandy Index website, as well as via the 63 examples of country snapshots included in this study.

The interactive online version of the Normandy Index also allows comparisons to be made between countries, individual countries and regions, and across time. In addition, rankings of countries based on only one or several threats are also available, using the source indicators.[27]

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[27] Normandy Index, EPRS, European Parliament, 2025.

Figure 5 – Normandy Index, 2025

Level of threat to peace

more at risk → moderate risk → less at risk

Rank	Country	NI	rank change
1	Switzerland	8.52	0
2	Norway	8.35	0
2	Iceland	8.35	2
4	New Zealand	8.20	1
5	Australia	7.97	-2
6	Mauritius	7.75	8
7	Canada	7.71	-1
8	Uruguay	7.69	5
9	Malaysia	7.62	-1
10	EU-27	7.56	0
11	Singapore	7.53	-4
12	South Korea	7.44	-3
13	Kosovo	7.41	5
14	United Kingdom	7.35	3
15	Qatar	7.29	4
16	Vietnam	7.25	-5
17	Japan	7.19	3
18	Oman	7.02	-6
19	Argentina	6.99	-3
20	Albania	6.96	6
21	Montenegro	6.87	24
21	Botswana	6.87	4
23	Costa Rica	6.86	-8
24	Saudi Arabia	6.77	24
25	Indonesia	6.75	-3
26	North Macedonia	6.74	-5
27	Kuwait	6.71	-3
28	Ghana	6.69	-5
29	United Arab Emirates	6.67	3
30	Mongolia	6.65	-3
31	Malawi	6.63	5
32	Paraguay	6.60	-3
33	Bhutan	6.52	16
34	Uzbekistan	6.48	7
34	Kazakhstan	6.48	13
36	Azerbaijan	6.46	-2
37	Trinidad and Tobago	6.42	0
38	Bahrain	6.41	20
39	Bolivia	6.36	21
40	Moldova	6.33	1
41	Serbia	6.30	-6
42	Peru	6.27	10
43	Chile	6.25	-5
43	Jamaica	6.25	10
43	Armenia	6.25	-12
46	Madagascar	6.22	4
47	Dominican Republic	6.21	-6

Rank	Country	NI	rank change
48	Rwanda	6.19	-8
48	Timor-Leste	6.17	9
50	Panama	6.17	4
50	Morocco	6.16	6
52	Sri Lanka	6.16	10
53	The Gambia	6.14	2
54	Nepal	6.10	-8
54	Bosnia and Herzegovina	6.10	-16
56	Zambia	6.05	12
56	Georgia	6.05	-26
58	Laos	6.04	14
59	Jordan	6.03	10
59	Tanzania	6.03	17
59	Sierra Leone	6.03	-15
62	Mauritania	5.95	25
62	China	5.95	-30
64	Thailand	5.94	5
64	Turkmenistan	5.94	9
64	Liberia	5.94	-5
67	Namibia	5.90	7
68	Cuba	5.89	-5
69	Kyrgyzstan	5.88	13
69	Guyana	5.88	-4
71	Israel	5.85	0
72	Tunisia	5.84	-12
	World average	**5.79**	-1
73	Benin	5.77	-6
74	United States	5.74	16
75	El Salvador	5.72	7
76	Senegal	5.71	-48
77	Guinea-Bissau	5.69	0
78	Egypt	5.68	12
79	Gabon	5.66	5
80	South Africa	5.62	0
81	Angola	5.59	22
82	Lesotho	5.57	3
82	Cote d'Ivoire	5.57	3
84	Papua New Guinea	5.56	-6
85	Ecuador	5.55	-35
86	Algeria	5.54	-21
87	Eswatini	5.53	11
88	Brazil	5.52	0
89	Equatorial Guinea	5.51	-14
90	Guatemala	5.50	6
91	India	5.49	2
92	Cambodia	5.48	-28

Rank	Country	NI	rank change
93	Kenya	5.46	-15
94	Philippines	5.39	-2
95	Belarus	5.35	-6
96	Türkiye	5.31	-2
97	Djibouti	5.29	7
98	Togo	5.27	1
99	Libya	5.23	2
100	Uganda	5.21	9
101	Mexico	5.20	-5
101	Tajikistan	5.20	6
103	Bangladesh	5.19	-23
104	Honduras	5.14	-4
105	Mozambique	5.12	1
106	Zimbabwe	5.07	-4
107	Guinea	4.97	5
108	Ukraine	4.92	10
109	Democratic Republic of the Congo	4.88	25
110	Colombia	4.74	4
111	Palestine	4.73	-17
112	Ethiopia	4.72	10
113	Nicaragua	4.64	-8
114	Venezuela	4.61	11
115	Burkina Faso	4.58	-2
116	Eritrea	4.56	10
117	Cameroon	4.44	-7
118	Niger	4.41	-2
119	Iran	4.40	-9
120	Lebanon	4.37	1
121	Burundi	4.35	-1
122	Sudan	4.34	-6
122	Myanmar	4.34	2
124	Russia	4.32	-16
125	North Korea	4.31	3
126	Pakistan	4.30	-4
127	Nigeria	4.29	-12
128	Iraq	4.18	2
129	Haiti	3.86	-3
130	Congo	3.83	-11
131	South Sudan	3.78	0
132	Yemen	3.74	0
133	Mali	3.70	-4
134	Syria	3.56	4
135	Chad	3.55	0
136	Somalia	3.51	-3
137	Afghanistan	3.45	0
138	Central African Republic	3.37	-2

3. The Normandy Index and its relevance for the European Parliament

According to the spring 2025 Eurobarometer surveys published in September 2025, in an increasingly unpredictable world, the EU emerges as a place of stability in the eyes of citizens.[28] While approval of EU membership reached its highest value in 2025 (73 % say that their country has benefited from being a member of the EU), there are also high expectations regarding the future role of the EU, with citizens emphasising security, defence, the economy, peace and democracy. Europeans are calling for more unity among Member States and stronger means to navigate the current international context. Global challenges are seen as becoming increasingly serious – 90 % say that EU Member States should be more united to tackle them. Furthermore, 68 % state that the role of the EU to protect its citizens against global crises and security risks should be strengthened in future. When people think about how the EU should strengthen its position in the world, defence and security are the first issues that come to mind (37 %).

While EU foreign and security policy remains in the intergovernmental sphere to a much larger extent than other policy areas, the Lisbon Treaty contributed to increasing the supranational EU institutions' contribution in this area. For the European Parliament, the most relevant provisions relate to consultation, oversight, accountability and budgetary functions. Article 36 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) obliges the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) to consult Parliament regularly on common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and common security and defence policy (CSDP) matters. It also stipulates that Parliament be kept informed of policy developments and requires Parliament's views to be taken 'duly into consideration'. The European Parliament therefore holds annual debates on the state of play of the CFSP and CSDP, on the basis of annual progress reports on their implementation. Parliament also votes on two annual own-initiative reports (INI) on the implementation of the CFSP and CSDP, puts questions to the HR/VP (including during the dedicated question time during plenary sessions), and makes recommendations to the HR/VP and the Council on related matters. Parliament exercises authority in security and defence matters through its function as budgetary authority. Most notably, the Parliament oversees civilian aspects of CSDP financed by the EU budget (Article 41 TEU).

The Normandy Index aims at contributing to the European Parliament's role in foreign policy-making and oversight. It offers Members of the European Parliament a measure of threats to peace throughout the world that is consistent with the EU's Global Strategy and, as has been shown, the Strategic Compass. Consequently, it responds to increased demand for accountability from actors involved in CFSP and CSDP, as well as providing an empirical argument in support of demands for attention to be paid to regions and countries at risk. At a time of growing demand for EU institutions to demonstrate greater legitimacy and transparency, the European Parliament's growing involvement in CFSP has helped increase democratic accountability. Although Parliament's formal powers in CFSP are limited, it nonetheless has growing influence as a 'norm entrepreneur' in human rights and democracy, both through its relationship with the HR/VP and as a diplomatic player through its delegations, mediation activity and parliamentary diplomacy. Importantly, in other areas of policy-making increasingly linked to peace, such as research and artificial intelligence (for example on defence or new technologies) and climate, the European Parliament has the full power to co-legislate.

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[28] Eurobarometer spring 2025 survey, European Parliament, 2025.

4. The added value of case studies

To illustrate the Normandy Index's potential to track peace and security, 63 case studies are set out in the following pages. Each case study includes an analysis of traditional sources of instability and threats to peace, a graphic representation of the situation in the country compared with other countries from the same region, and notable points of interest regarding the country's performance in the ranking. A focus on new sources of insecurity and an analysis of the EU's contribution and assistance in building resilience through its involvement with the country in question completes the picture.

The EU contributes in many ways (development cooperation, support for democracy and human rights, cooperation within the European Neighbourhood or regional cooperation, pre-accession assistance, peacekeeping, trade agreements and now also the provision of military equipment) and varies from country to country, depending on the degree and type of cooperation in place. The case studies represent key EU partners (strategic partners or trade partners), countries in which the EU operates military or civilian missions, G20 members, or those with notable vulnerabilities or achievements on one or more of the Normandy Index variables. New case studies have been added to last year's study.

All case studies are available in interactive form on the Normandy Index website.[29] The website allows users to produce comparative graphs for the EU-27 and each of the 137 countries studied.

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29   See online version at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/infographics/peaceandsecurity/index.html.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan ranks 137th on the Normandy Index. Following the Taliban takeover in 2021, and the subsequent withdrawal of United States and NATO troops, the country is suffering from widespread instability and economic collapse. The crisis is compounded by the effects of climate change and successive climate-related disasters, and the country is at risk of widespread famine.

Background and key issues

The Cold War saw an unsuccessful and protracted Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, with 10 years of war ending in Soviet troop withdrawal in 1989. Persisting conflict between the Soviet-backed Afghan government and the Mujahedeen led to the Taliban taking power in 1995, promising to bring peace. The events of 11 September 2001 and the Taliban's response to this attack reignited an intensely violent conflict in the country, as US forces invaded in a bid to oust the Taliban. For 20 years, US-backed governments ruled Afghanistan, but following a renewed Taliban takeover of Kabul in August 2021, US and allied NATO forces left the country.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

New security and hybrid threats

Threat comparison

Afghanistan increasingly suffers from the effects of climate change and natural disasters, which exacerbate existing tensions. The 2023 Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index ranks it the 12th most vulnerable country to climate change. Since 2018, the country has faced successive climate-related disasters, such as extreme drought and flash floods, both significant drivers of displacement and food insecurity. In addition, over the last few years (including August 2025), powerful earthquakes have struck the country, affecting millions of people and further worsening the already dire humanitarian situation. Extreme weather, natural disasters and conflict have led to the displacement of millions; as of 2025, 10.3 million Afghans remain displaced within their country or in neighbouring countries. In 2025, Afghanistan was the ninth-most country impacted by terrorism.

EU involvement

The EU has supported Afghanistan with development and humanitarian aid for decades, with funding amounting to around €2 billion since 1994. Following the return of the Taliban regime in August 2021, the EU established a minimum presence on the ground in Kabul, continuing to provide humanitarian aid, livelihood and basic needs support along with international partners. The EU's operational engagement is conditional on the behaviour of the new Afghan government – measured according to five benchmarks, including the government's commitment that Afghanistan will not serve as a base for the export of terrorism to other countries and respect for human rights, in particular women's rights, the rule of law and freedom of the media.

Albania

Albania ranks 20th on the Normandy Index. Since the end of the Balkan Wars in the early 1990s, the country has made such significant progress on political and economic reforms that it joined NATO in April 2009, and opened talks with the EU on accession in March 2020. Albania is a clear example of religious tolerance and diversity. Despite this, the country still faces significant economic and democratic hurdles, as well as challenges linked to democratic processes.

Background and key issues

Enmeshed in the Balkan Wars of 1990 to 1993, Albania continued to suffer from domestic civil unrest, which erupted in 1997 in the 'pyramid crisis', alongside military involvement in the Kosovo conflict against Serbia. Albania's GDP increased from 2.1 % (2019) to 3.9 % in 2024 and its public debt decreased from the peak of 74.1 % in 2021 to 54.7 % in 2024. Judicial cooperation with Albania is facilitated by Eurojust, as one of the 11 non-EU countries that has a liaison prosecutor at the agency.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Albania — Europe

New security and hybrid threats

Threat comparison

■ Albania more at risk   ■ Europe more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

Despite encouraging macroeconomic developments, Albania has seen limited progress in democratic processes, as parliamentary elections are regularly accompanied by allegations of vote-buying and anti-government protests. The 14 May 2023 local elections were well administered, but marked by deep division within the opposition. Albania's parliamentary elections on 11 May 2025 were 'competitive and professionally managed, but they took place in a highly polarised environment and contestants did not enjoy a level playing field'. In its 2025 progress report, the Commission notes 'the firm political commitment of the Albanian authorities to the strategic goal of EU integration'. The Commission also welcomed Albania's record of full compliance with the EU's common foreign and security policy, aligning with the EU position, including on restrictive measures and sanctions against Russia.

EU involvement

In March 2020, a political agreement was reached to open accession negotiations. Albania's negotiations opened on 19 July 2022 at the first EU-Albania intergovernmental conference. Following the second intergovernmental conference of 15 October 2024, which opened accession negotiations on cluster 1: fundamentals, four intergovernmental conferences were convened leading to the opening of negotiations on four clusters. Albania has continued to implement the stabilisation and association agreement. The EU is the largest provider of financial assistance to the country. The Commission's 2025 rule of law report covered Albania for the second time.

Algeria

Algeria ranks 86th on the Normandy Index, with a below-average score for Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries on cybersecurity, democratic processes and economic crisis. Political life in Algeria has long been dominated by a closed elite drawn from the military and the ruling party, the National Liberation Front (FLN). While there are multiple opposition parties in Parliament, elections are distorted by fraud, and electoral processes are not transparent.

Background and key issues

Algeria suffers from internal instability and deteriorating bilateral relations with several countries, particularly Morocco (dispute over Western Sahara recognition) and France. The 2019 presidential elections were marked by fraud. In 2023, Wassini Bouazza, the former director of internal security was sentenced to 16 years imprisonment for attempting to fix the result of the 2019 presidential election. The Hirak protests did not achieve democratic changes. In June 2023, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune made a high-profile trip to Russia to sign a bilateral enhanced strategic partnership. He secured a second term in power in September 2024. In November 2024, security forces arrested French-Algerian writer Boualem Sansal, alleging that he had threatened national unity; he was pardoned and released from prison following German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier's intervention in November 2025.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Algeria — MENA

Threat comparison

■ Algeria more at risk ■ MENA more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

Freedom House marked Algeria as 'not free' (30/100). Amnesty International has highlighted fair trial violations (including in death sentence cases) and torture claims reported by activists. The expulsion of Mohamed Benhalima, a dissident and whistleblower who fled the country in 2019, received significant media attention. Rising gas exports continue to boost the economy. Nevertheless, as noted by the IMF, 'with the fiscal buffers depleted, large fiscal deficits pose significant financing and debt challenges, warranting urgent policy adjustment … The sharp deterioration of the fiscal situation in 2024 has heightened near-term risks and increased Algeria's overall risk of sovereign stress to "high".'

EU involvement

The 2022 EU-Algeria association agreement (AA) entered into force in 2005. The EU and Algeria adopted new partnership priorities in 2017, as part of the renewed European Neighbourhood Policy. The EU and Algeria continue high-level dialogue on energy and security sectors, as well as informal dialogue on migration. A revised strategy for the Southern Neighbourhood was adopted on 9 February 2021, accompanied by an economic and investment plan for the southern neighbours. The EU funded three projects under its instrument contributing to stability and peace (IcSP) in Algeria, including on counter-terrorism.

Armenia

Armenia ranks 43rd on the Normandy Index, significantly lower than in 2024. Recent progress in peace negotiations with Azerbaijan offers the prospect of concluding a three-decade conflict, although the Armenian government will have to bear political costs. Armenia remains fragile in energy security and cybersecurity and faces a number of hybrid threats, mainly from Russia.

Background and key issues

Armenia has been in conflict with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region since the end of the Cold War. Two bloody episodes, in 1992 and in 2020, have alternated with periods of frozen conflict over three decades, with the international community unable to reach a political settlement. The Russian-brokered 9 November 2020 agreement put an end to the 2020 war, leaving the status of Nagorno-Karabakh unresolved, with a Russian Federation peacekeeping contingent posted to the region. In March 2025, the governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia announced the conclusion of negotiations over a 17-article peace agreement, an agreement in principle confirmed by both leaders in August 2025 during a tripartite summit under President Trump. However, as a precondition for its signature Azerbaijan demands amendment to Armenia's constitution, claiming it includes an implicit territorial claim over Nagorno-Karabakh.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Armenia — Eastern Partnership

Threat comparison

■ Armenia more at risk ■ Eastern Partnership more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine created new security challenges for Armenia, a traditional Russian ally. Russia's role as security guarantor is in question, with Armenia having 'frozen' its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and periodically announcing its future withdrawal. Although Armenia scores above the regional average on several indicators, it is subject to persistent influence and disinformation operations orchestrated by Russia. Armenia also ranks low on energy security, reflecting its dependence on Russian energy, which the long-term energy security strategy aims to address.

EU involvement

The EU has a strong interest in a politically stable Southern Caucasus region, including Armenia, which is part of the EU's Eastern Partnership, and has significantly stepped up its presence in the region against the backdrop of Russia's waning role as security guarantor. A fully-fledged civilian mission in Armenia (EUMA) was deployed in February 2023, and the EU has been an active player in peace negotiations. Armenia's relations with the EU are based on the comprehensive and enhanced partnership agreement (CEPA) which entered into force in 2021. In March 2025 the Armenian parliament adopted a bill calling on the government to begin EU accession talks, although this path seems for the moment a remote objective.

Australia

Australia ranks 5th on the Normandy Index, indicating low levels of risk. It performs particularly well in democratic processes, state resilience and the management of economic crises, thanks to its robust democratic system. However, recent geopolitical events could increase its security risks.

Background and key issues

Australia has a long-standing democratic tradition in the form of a parliamentary system, enhanced by strong levels of education and a high per capita GDP. The 2024 Human Development Index, ranks Australia 7th of the 191 countries measured. The Economist Intelligence Unit's 2023 Democracy Index ranks Australia 14th overall, after Canada and before Japan. In addition, according to the Normandy Index fragile states indicator, it is the world's 6th most stable country. This is largely due to strong perceptions of state legitimacy, effective public services and low levels of external intervention. According to the Press Freedom Index, Australia comes 29th of 180 countries in 2025, a gain of 10 places since last year. The Human Rights Watch 2025 world report notes, however, that the country's positive reputation is tarnished

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Australia — Asia-Pacific

by its treatment of children in the criminal justice system and refugees and asylum seekers, and the failure to address systemic discrimination against First Nations people.

New security and hybrid threats

Thanks to its resilient democratic institutions, high standard of living and public services, and relative remoteness from the world's most densely populated regions, Australia has long been insulated from traditional security and hybrid threats. However, relations with its largest trade partner, China, have recently grown more complex, and despite a marginal improvement since 2023, there are concerns that growing US–China strategic rivalry could spill over into the South Pacific, making Australia's strategic near environment less benign. The first national climate risk assessment was released in September 2025.

Threat comparison

■ Australia more at risk ■ Asia-Pacific more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

EU involvement

The 2017 EU–Australia framework agreement has been in force since October 2022. In 2018, the EU launched negotiations with Australia on a bilateral free trade agreement. The EU–Australia mutual recognition agreement facilitates trade in industrial products by reducing technical barriers. The agreement creates mutual recognition of conformity assessment procedures, thus reducing the cost of testing and certifying exports and imports. Australia has contributed to EUCAP NESTOR (now EUCAP Somalia), an EU-led maritime capacity building mission in the Horn of Africa and Western Indian Ocean, and the EU advisory mission in support of security sector reform in Iraq (EUAM Iraq). Australia is mentioned as a regional partner in the EU strategy for the Indo-Pacific.

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan ranks 36th on the Normandy Index, a slight deterioration from last year. With weak democratic processes and accusations of serious human rights breaches, Azerbaijan remains fragile in democratic processes, although it scores highly on energy security and counter-terrorism.

Background and key issues

Azerbaijan has been embroiled in a conflict with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region since the break-up of the Soviet Union. Two episodes of conflict in 1992 and in 2020 have alternated with periods of frozen conflict. The Russian-brokered 9 November 2020 agreement put an end to the 2020 war, leaving the status of Nagorno-Karabakh unresolved, with a Russian Federation peacekeeping contingent posted to the region (see the Armenia entry for more information). After months of bilateral talks, having excluded EU and US mediation, in March 2025 the governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia announced the conclusion of negotiations over a 17-article peace agreement, an agreement in principle confirmed by both leaders in August 2025 during a tripartite summit under President Trump. However, as a precondition for its signature, Azerbaijan demands amendment to Armenia's constitution, claiming it includes an implicit territorial claim over Nagorno-Karabakh.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Azerbaijan   — Eastern Partnership

Threat comparison

■ Azerbaijan more at risk   ■ Eastern Partnership more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 altered the geopolitical chessboard in the South Caucasus. The waning role of Russia, a traditional ally of Armenia, and the growing importance of Turkey, a traditional ally of Azerbaijan, coupled with its vast energy resources, have placed Azerbaijan in an advantageous strategic position. Against this backdrop, Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev easily secured a fifth term in the February 2024 snap presidential elections, seen by OSCE observers as devoid of genuine pluralism. The human rights and democratic freedom situation in Azerbaijan continues to cause concern, and the country scores very low in terms of democratic processes and in disinformation resilience.

EU involvement

The EU has a strong interest in a politically stable Southern Caucasus region, including in Azerbaijan, part of the EU Eastern Partnership. Azerbaijan has so far not allowed the EU civilian mission in Armenia (EUMA, deployed in 2023) to monitor its side of the border. EU-Azerbaijan bilateral relations are based on the EU-Azerbaijan partnership and cooperation agreement, in force since 1999. Negotiations on a new comprehensive agreement were launched in 2017. On 18 July 2022, the European Commission signed a memorandum of understanding with Azerbaijan to increase its imports of Azeri natural gas to at least 20 billion cubic metres a year by 2027.

Bangladesh

Bangladesh ranks 103rd on the Normandy Index, making it more at risk than the South Asian average in democratic processes, violent conflicts and climate change risk. Poverty, political violence and freedom of expression rights are also concerns.

Background and key issues

Bangladesh has made progress on reducing poverty since independence in 1971, but in recent years, the trend has reversed. In May 2023 the UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights warned of rising income inequality and drew attention to an emerging new category of poverty; the upper poverty line increased to 23.11 % of households in the 2024 survey. Analysts warn of the country's economic over-reliance on the garment sector, despite a favourable tariff on exports to the US secured in August 2025. The current democratic opportunity following the popular 2024 uprising brought Nobel Peace Prize winning economist Muhammad Yunus to lead an interim government. However, this has not strengthened the country, which in the 2024 Fragile State Index ranked 37th most fragile of 179 states. Further political violence is possible in the lead-up to the 2026 general elections.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Bangladesh — South Asia

Threat comparison

■ Bangladesh more at risk ■ South Asia more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

The 2025 Press Freedom Index ranks Bangladesh 149th out of 180 countries. Media freedom remains under threat, as shown by the interim government's decision in 2024 to rescind the accreditation cards of several journalists. The November 2024 Cyber Protection Ordinance repealed the previous regime's Cyber Security Act, but raises concerns about freedom of expression. Bangladesh is highly vulnerable to natural disasters from climate change, including rising sea levels, extreme weather events and changing rainfall patterns. The low-lying delta (Asia's largest and the world's most populous) makes Bangladesh prone to flooding.

EU involvement

The EU's 2021-2027 multiannual indicative programme for Bangladesh identifies three priorities: (i) human capital development; (ii) green inclusive development; and (iii) inclusive governance. Under the Global Gateway, in 2023 the EU and Bangladesh signed a €400 million agreement for renewable energy. In March 2025, the EU allocated €32.3 million in humanitarian aid for Bangladesh in response to the Rohingya refugee crisis. The first EU-Bangladesh political dialogue in November 2022 agreed to launch a climate dialogue. The EU is Bangladesh's main trading partner: in 2024 total trade in goods amounted to €22.2 billion. Bangladesh benefits from the 'everything but arms' (EBA) generalised scheme of preferences (GSP).

Belarus

Belarus ranks 95th on the Normandy Index. The country's involvement in Russia's war on Ukraine, preceded by a brutal crackdown against its citizens protesting against electoral fraud, as well as the regime's dependence on Russian support, are some of the key factors in its peace profile.

Background and key issues

Belarus gained independence in 1991, when it signed the treaty dissolving the Soviet Union. In 1994, Alexander Lukashenko was elected its first president. With a poor human rights record over many years, the falsified August 2020 presidential elections were followed by a brutal crackdown against protesters, costing lives. Increasing repression against Belarusian civil society and independent media, as well as the Lukashenko regime's support for Russia's war in Ukraine, mean a high risk of violent conflict and a very poor assessment of democratic processes. 52 prisoners were released in 2025, but the number of political prisoners remains critically high.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Belarus — Russia and Eurasia

New security and hybrid threats

Threat comparison

■ Belarus more at risk ■ Russia and Eurasia more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

Belarus's involvement in Russia's war on Ukraine initially enabled Russia to attack Kyiv from the north, when Lukashenko authorised the firing of ballistic missiles from Belarusian territory and transport of Russian troops and military equipment. The 2022 constitutional referendum, among other changes, renounced deletion of the words: 'the Republic of Belarus aims at making its territory a nuclear-free zone, and the state neutral'. In 2023, Russia announced it would deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, a move seen as increasing pressure on the EU and NATO's eastern border. In September 2025, Russia and Belarus military exercises included a joint nuclear drill, as well as extensive use of unmanned systems and radio-electronic warfare.

EU involvement

The EU does not recognise the results of the August 2020 elections and sanctioned Belarus for its increasing human rights abuses. In June 2021, Belarus announced its withdrawal from the Eastern Partnership and the EU–Belarus human rights dialogue. In September 2021, the Commission announced the partial suspension of the EU–Belarus visa facilitation agreement. The EU condemned the country's participation in Russia's war in Ukraine and imposed new economic sanctions. The EU has mobilised €170 million in support of the Belarusian people since August 2020, and has outlined a €3 billion economic support package available upon the country's democratic transition. A September 2025 statement by the HR/VP highlights that Belarusian–Russian military drills, along with repeated violation of EU Member States' airspace by Russian drones, does not demonstrate a commitment to de-escalation and peace. The HR/VP set up a consultative group with Belarus democratic forces and civil society which met for a fifth time in 2025.

Bolivia

Bolivia ranks 39th on the Normandy Index, a significant improvement from last year's ranking (60th). The country has been challenged by instability, and political and social polarisation, particularly since 2019, when the results of presidential elections were nullified following significant social unrest. Protests continued long after new elections in 2020, which saw the victory of Evo Morales' party candidate Luis Arce.

Background and key issues

The marginalisation of Bolivia's 36 groups of indigenous inhabitants has a long history; indigenous rights were not formally recognised until 1994. This changed with the election of Morales in 2005, the first indigenous president in South America. He introduced land redistribution and rights reforms, reallocating land away from non-indigenous Bolivians and commercial farmers. Since then, the leftist Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), first under former president Evo Morales (2006-19) and later under his successor, President Luis Arce, has dominated the political landscape. However, Morales had been engaged in a power struggle with Arce since 2022. Then, in October 2025, Rodrigo Paz, a centrist senator, won Bolivia's presidential election with 54 % of votes, ending 20 years of MAS rule. He

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Bolivia   — South America

faces Bolivia's worst economic crisis in 40 years, with high inflation and a shortage of fuel and dollars.

New security and hybrid threats

Like much of the region, Bolivia demonstrates high vulnerability to cyber-attack, and faces disinformation challenges. In December 2023, the Constitutional Court ruled that no president could serve more than two terms (consecutive or otherwise), a ruling that might not suffice to end hostilities within the MAS and in wider society. Bolivia recently shifted from a coca-cultivating country to a producer and exporter of cocaine, with a 13 % share of world coca production, just below Colombia (61 %) and Peru (26 %). Counter-narcotics operations revealed sophisticated drug laboratories in the country.

Threat comparison

■ Bolivia more at risk   ■ South America more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

EU involvement

Bolivia benefits from the security-development nexus and the EU generalised scheme of preferences plus (GSP+). The EU has an indicative allocation of €104 million in grant funding to the Bolivia partnership in 2021-27. The 8th high-level dialogue between Bolivia and the EU resumed in 2022 in La Paz. The 9th dialogue took place in Brussels on 30 January 2025. The Global Gateway for Bolivia has two priority areas: critical raw materials and renewable energy. The Team Europe proposal in Bolivia includes support for sustainable cities and climate change-resilient landscapes.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina ranks 54th on the Normandy Index, remaining more at risk than the European average, particularly on democratic processes. Recent developments, mainly in the Republika Srpska entity, run counter to the positive momentum of EU integration and reforms.

Background and key issues

Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced armed conflict between 1992 and 1995, triggering several international peacekeeping missions. In 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement resulted in a decentralised government system, dividing the country into two semi-independent federal units, Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Failing decentralised governance is partly the reason for Bosnia and Herzegovina's second lowest Fragile States Index score in Europe, just after Ukraine. Cooperation between the country's constitutional entities is hampered by mistrust among ethnic groups, religions, political parties and foreign policy. Just over half the population practises Islam, Orthodox Christians make up 31 % and Catholicism is practised by 15 %. The country is heavily dependent on coal (54 % of electricity production), but is investing in renewable energies, with vast hydro and non-hydro potential.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

—— Bosnia and Herzegovina   —— Europe

Threat comparison

■ Bosnia and Herzegovina more at risk   ■ Europe more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

In 2021, Milorad Dodik, leader of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats party, threatened to withdraw Bosnian Serbs from the country's key institutions. Dodik reiterated a threat to secede a day ahead of a UN vote on the 1995 Srebrenica Bosnian genocide. In 2025, Dodik was removed from office after being sentenced to a year in prison for defying decisions from the Office of the High Representative. In November 2025, Siniša Karan, backed by Dodik, won the snap presidential election in Republika Srpska, effectively extending Dodik's rule. Another risk relates to electoral and constitutional reforms. The country is vulnerable to disinformation and ranks 86th of 180 countries in the Press Freedom Indicator.

EU involvement

Since 2004, the EUFOR Althea mission has supported the country's efforts to secure peace following the Dayton Peace Agreement. In 2019, the Commission approved moving towards opening accession negotiations. Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a candidate country since 2022, with the EU supporting reforms through the pre-accession instrument. In 2021-2023, the EU contributed to military and medical capabilities through the European Peace Facility. In December 2023, the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, which began in March 2024, but the start of formal negotiations is pending the adoption of key reforms, particularly in the judiciary.

Brazil

Brazil ranks 88th on the Normandy Index, its position stable since last year. The country performs below the South American average, particularly in crime and violent conflict. It ranks better in energy security, democratic processes, terrorism and cybersecurity.

Background and key issues

President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva took office in January 2023. Shortly afterwards, supporters of former president Jair Bolsonaro stormed Congress, the Supreme Court and the Presidential Palace calling for a coup. In 2025, former president Bolsonaro was convicted by Brazil's Supreme Court. Rapid deforestation and fires are pushing the Amazon rainforest to a tipping point. The Human Development Index ranked Brazil 84th of 191. The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index ranks the country 51st, performing well on electoral process and pluralism. Brazil ranks 78th on the 2025 Press Freedom Index. The 2025 Human Rights Watch notes that gender–based violence remains a chronic problem.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

Threat comparison

New security and hybrid threats

At regional level, Brazil's performance is above average, especially for cybersecurity. The country has increased its resilience to disinformation. Climate change remains a big risk; in 2024 the Rio Grande do Sul state experienced its worst flooding in 80 years which displaced tens of thousands. The same year, the country suffered the worst drought on record, and more than 27 million hectares were burned. HRW points out that the previous administration was responsible for the highest annual deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon rainforest of the past 15 years. Political instability remains a threat, as Bolsonaro begins his prison sentence.

EU involvement

The EU and Brazil entered into a strategic partnership in 2007. Sectoral dialogues with the EU support Brazil to strengthen vulnerable groups' human rights and counter violence. To enhance resilience to disinformation, the EU provides funding for projects on fake news. The EU's partnership instrument funds numerous sustainability projects. Brazil also benefits from the EU programme for Latin America, EUROCLIMA+. In 2019, the EU and the four founding members of Mercosur (including Brazil) reached an agreement in principle on a comprehensive trade agreement. In 2023, the HR/VP and the Commission adopted a joint communication for a new agenda for relations between the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean. Brazil remains a key EU trade partner. Boosted by shipments of oil, unroasted coffee and Brazilian soybeans, the volume of Brazilian exports to the EU jumped 46.2 % in 2024 compared with the same period in 2023.

Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso ranks 115th on the Normandy Index.

Background and key issues

In 2024, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger established the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and withdrew from the West African community ECOWAS. Burkina Faso faces an overwhelming risk of violent extremism, accounting for one fifth of all deaths caused by terrorism globally, primarily due to clashes between government forces and militants, such as the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, the Islamic State-Sahel Province, and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. Protracted conflict has aggravated the humanitarian crisis. Of its population of 23 million, nearly 6 million people need humanitarian assistance in 2025 and more than 2 million are internally displaced people. 1.5 to 3 million citizens need emergency food assistance. Thousands of schools and hundreds of health facilities have closed. Blockades are severely restricting humanitarian access to over 1 million people.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

Burkina Faso ——   sub-Saharan Africa ——

Threat comparison

Burkina Faso more at risk ■   sub-Saharan Africa more at risk ■

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

Terrorist groups increasingly use new weapons such as explosive devices or drones to target civilians, including aid workers. They fuel inter-community rivalries and converge with organised crime. Several large-scale attacks and massacres took place in Burkina Faso in 2025; security forces are also accused of unlawful killings of civilians. Democracy is backsliding: the civil government was dissolved and the military government has announced it will extend junta rule until 2029. Foreign and local media have been closed, and various activists, journalists and lawyers have reportedly been arrested, conscripted or have disappeared. After the forced withdrawal of Western forces, Burkina Faso concluded a strategic alliance with Russia, while denying contracting Russian paramilitaries. Disinformation campaigns by both pro-government and extremist groups are documented.

EU involvement

Since 2007, the EU has allocated €200 million for humanitarian aid in the country, and €45 million for humanitarian action in 2024 alone. The EU has kept dialogue open with the transitional government and has not suspended all of its aid. Budget support, cooperation with the state and security forces are on hold, but direct support for the most vulnerable populations, for democratic culture, and to respond to anti-EU disinformation campaigns has been maintained.

Canada

Canada ranks 7th on the Normandy Index, indicating low levels of risk. It performs better than the world average on all indicators, notably in democratic processes, resilience against economic crisis and cybersecurity.

Background and key issues

The latest Human Development Index ranked Canada 16th of 191 countries measured. The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index ranks Canada 13th overall, performing exceptionally well in electoral process and pluralism and political participation, but its ranking has suffered from rising polarisation and diminishing confidence in government. Canada is the world's 5th most stable country, as measured by the fragile states indicator. Canada was ranked 48th on the 2025 Global Terrorism Index.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Canada — North America

New security and hybrid threats

Threat comparison

■ Canada more at risk ■ North America more at risk

WMD
Violent conflict
Terrorism
Resilience to disinformation
Fragile states
Energy insecurity
Economic crises
Democratic processes
Cybersecurity
Crime
Climate change

Line represents equal level of risk

Canada has high levels of economic development and human capital, and is the ninth largest economy globally, as measured by the economic crises indicator. Canada is one of only a few developed countries to be a net exporter of energy. Canadian society enjoys a high level of press freedom, ranking 21st on the 2025 Press Freedom Index. The country ranks 46th on crime, marginally better than the North American region. Cybercrime, in the form of online fraud and attempts to steal personal, financial and corporate information, continues to be the most significant threat to cybersecurity. The Human Rights Watch 2025 World Report noted that, while the Canadian government has made progress in advancing human rights, there are still concerns regarding systemic racism and abuses against indigenous peoples.

EU involvement

Canada has been a formal strategic EU partner since 2016. Since then, both have reinforced their foreign policy and sectoral cooperation to uphold their joint commitment to promote democratic principles and human rights and strengthen international peace, security and rules-based multilateralism. Canada joined the permanent structured cooperation military mobility project in 2021. The EU and Canada have also concluded a security of information agreement to exchange classified information. In 2017, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) provisionally entered into force. 2021 saw a strategic partnership on raw materials. In 2022, the EU and Canada set up a working group on the green transition and liquefied natural gas to contribute to greater sustainability and energy security. Finally, the EU and Canada joined forces as leaders in the international fight against climate change, including by co-convening meetings of the Ministerial on Climate Action (MoCA) with China (the most recent was held in July 2023).

Central African Republic

At 138th, the Central African Republic (CAR) ranks last on the Normandy Index. The country has struggled through ongoing episodes of civil war since 2003. Foreign fighters, including the Russia-backed Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group), are very active. The political and security situation remains fragile, with serious risk of escalating into violent conflict.

Background and key issues

Although President Faustin-Archange Touadéra was democratically elected in 2016, violence between politically motivated armed groups remains a threat. The Anti-Balaka alliance dominates the country's south-west and the former Seleka militia the north-west. Following the 2023 referendum, the revised constitution extended the presidential term from five to seven years and removed term limits, allowing Touadéra to run again in the presidential, legislative, regional and local elections set for 28 December 2025. The CAR ranked 8th on the 2025 Fragile States Index. CAR has great energy potential, including in green energy. Mineral extraction and exploitation are intrinsic to the 'business model' of Russian (and Rwandan) presence in the country as security providers.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

—— Central African Republic —— sub-Saharan Africa

Threat comparison

■ Central African Republic more at risk
■ sub-Saharan Africa more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

pursuant to Resolution 2745 (2024).

The current mandate of the UN stabilisation force (MINUSCA, with Rwanda as the main troops provider) was extended until 15 November 2026.

New security and hybrid threats

The CAR is vulnerable to the emerging threats affecting weak states, including threats to cybersecurity and press freedom. The CAR is one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change. A Rwandan intervention force is present in the country (in addition to the MINUSCA). The presence of Russian mercenaries has worsened security. The CAR abstained in the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russian aggression against Ukraine, and its president criticised the west in March 2023, calling for an end to the arms and diamond embargo. A targeted arms embargo was imposed until 31 July 2026 by the UNSC

EU involvement

The EU military training mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM CAR) is still advising and training national forces. President Touadéra acknowledged its importance during the 5th edition of the RCA–EU partnership dialogue held in Bangui in 2024. A civilian advisory mission, EUAM RCA, was launched in 2020. However, mercenaries' activities may threaten the future of these missions. The CAR benefits from duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market ('everything but arms'). Under the NDICI-Global Europe Instrument, the multiannual indicative programme (MIP) allocates €172 million to the CAR for 2021-2024. EU sanctions and arms embargo are other markers of the state of bilateral relations.

Chad

Chad ranks 135th on the Normandy Index, much weaker than most sub-Saharan African countries. The country suffers from a complex set of insurgencies, particularly around Lake Chad, and from the spillover effects of conflict in neighbouring countries, particularly the civil war in Sudan. This is further compounded by climate fragility and food insecurity.

Background and key issues

After a three-year transitional period, Mahamat Déby won the controversial presidential election on 6 May 2024. Chad's economy remains vulnerable to increased pressure on natural resources due to climate change and population displacement. It faces a protracted crisis around Lake Chad, where Boko Haram and other groups' attacks and repression by the military, have triggered massive internal and cross-border displacements. Since April 2023, the civil war in Sudan has caused refugee movements into Chad, pushing the country into a humanitarian catastrophe. Overall, 7 million people in Chad need humanitarian aid in 2025.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

New security and hybrid threats

Threat comparison

Chad's authorities have used a mix of strategies to manage widespread discontent. They offered free water and electricity to households at the end of 2024 and have also cracked down on dissent by banning or repressing protests. The killing of opposition leader Yaya Dillo by security forces in 2024 has remained unpunished. Chad contravened military agreements with France in December 2024 in favour of new partners such as Russia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. The civil war in Sudan has multiple impacts on Chad: the influx of Sudanese refugees and returning Chadians is straining refugee camps and fuelling tensions between communities. Chad has also been accused of allowing UAE drones to fly from its border to support the Sudanese paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

EU involvement

In line with its strategy for the Sahel, EU cooperation with Chad aims to strengthen Chad's security and governance, human development, sustainable agriculture and clean energy. The EU-Chad cooperation programme is expected to counter terrorism, radicalisation, illegal trafficking, irregular migration and forced displacement. To address the humanitarian needs triggered by internal and external conflicts and climate change, in 2024 the EU allocated over €85 million in humanitarian aid. In 2025, the EU has mobilised over €541.6 million in humanitarian, development and peace assistance to respond to the overwhelming impact on displaced people, their hosting communities and population directly impacted by insecurity in the Sahel and Lake Chad countries.

China

China ranks 62nd on the Normandy Index. Since the start of economic reforms in 1978, China has become the world's second largest economy in terms of nominal GDP after the USA, and first in purchasing power parity (PPP). However, increasing signs of rising structural challenges to China's economy, including demographic and environmental, imply much more moderate mid-term growth. Even before President Xi announced more ambitious targets in the fight against climate change on 24 September 2025, China performed relatively well on the climate criterion.

Background and key issues

Permanent member of the UN Security Council, China's claims to sovereignty over Taiwan and several maritime areas in the East and South China Seas are increasingly heavily contested. To support its position, China fields the world's largest army and second largest defence budget. China also possesses active nuclear weapons. While China performs well on crime, cybersecurity and economic crisis indicators, it scores very badly on democratic processes and resilience to disinformation. It performs poorly on the Fragile States Index, in particular on human rights and rule of law. Some states have labelled ongoing authoritarian state repression in Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang as genocide.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— China — Asia-Pacific

Threat comparison

■ China more at risk   ■ Asia-Pacific more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

China's continued dependence on coal has dangerous implications for the environment and human health. China produced 32 % of global CO2 emissions in 2024, making it the world's largest emitter. In 2025, China officially set 2060 as its target for carbon neutrality. President Xi has announced new, more ambitious targets in the fight against climate change, such as a cut in greenhouse gas emissions by 7 % to 10 % by 2035. As 'the world's largest prison for journalists', China fell to 178th of 180 states on the World Press Freedom Index.

EU involvement

The 2019 joint communication on EU-China, described China as a 'cooperation partner ... an economic competitor ... and a systemic rival'. The EU and China established a strategic partnership in 2003 through more than 60 dialogue formats, including on non-proliferation and disarmament. These contributed to the 2020 EU-China strategic agenda for cooperation. The regular EU-China human rights dialogue also raises issues such as freedom of expression and of religious belief, although with very limited progress. In 2020, the EU and China concluded, 'in principle', a comprehensive agreement on investment, now frozen. The EU imposed sanctions on Chinese officials accused of perpetrating human rights abuses against the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang. Parliament resolution of 8 May 2025 on violations of religious freedom in Tibet strongly condemns China's repressive policies and violations of human rights.

Colombia

Colombia ranks 110th on the Normandy Index. It is more at risk than the regional average in terrorism, crime, disinformation and fragile states indicators. Colombia performs well in the energy sector with strong hydrocarbon potential, untapped under current leftist president, Gustavo Petro.

Background and key issues

Internal armed conflicts, violence, kidnappings and forced displacement continue to pose a major security challenge in Colombia, despite the historic 2016 peace agreement by former president Juan Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). In power since August 2022, President Gustavo Petro, former member of this Marxist guerrilla group, pledged to bring 'total peace' to the country by 2025. However, on 17 January 2025, peace talks between the Colombian government and the biggest remaining guerilla group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), were suspended.

New security and hybrid threats

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

—— Colombia   —— South America

Threat comparison

■ Colombia more at risk   ■ South America more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

Ahead of the 31 May 2026 presidential elections, Colombia has experienced a series of terrorist attacks, including the assassination of opposition senator and presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay in June 2025. The terrorist attacks have occurred in several areas of Colombia and resulted in the death and injury of dozens of civilians and law enforcement personnel. According to the Gini coefficient, Colombia has also been the most unequal country in Latin America since 2021. In its 2024 report, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime noted increasing foreign organised crime groups, including from Mexico, Israel and the Balkans. Coca cultivation in the country grew by 10 % in 2024, meaning an annual cocaine production potential of 1 577 tonnes.

EU involvement

The EU supported the Colombian peace process with €645 million for action such as the Peace Laboratories and the Peace Territories project, the Trust Fund for Colombia (to which 21 EU Member States and Chile pledged €125 million), European Investment Bank loans, and the IcSP, which mobilised an extra €40 million for critical elements of the peace process, such as transitional justice. Eamon Gilmore, EU special envoy from 2015 to 2019, considered the EU's role in the peace process a success. Development cooperation between EU and Colombia totalled €127 million for 2014–2020. The EU has a comprehensive trade agreement with Colombia, Peru and Ecuador, applied provisionally since 2013. The 4th summit between the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the EU took place in Colombia in November 2025.

Costa Rica

Costa Rica ranks 23rd in the Normandy Index, indicating relatively low levels of risk. It has been a model of peace in a volatile Central American and Caribbean region. Ranking well in democratic processes, it has a long history of democratic stability, with smooth transitions of power through free and fair elections.

Background and key issues

Costa Rica abolished its military in 1948, following the end of an intense civil war. This had positive ramifications for its score on violent conflict, terrorism and WMD. There is limited threat of armed conflict within the country, and it enjoys good relations with neighbouring states. However, crime is on the rise in Costa Rica. In 2025, high-ranking government officials were charged with alleged involvement in corruption and drug trafficking networks, suggesting that organised crime has spread to the highest levels of power.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Costa Rica   — Central America and Caribbean

Threat comparison

■ Costa Rica more at risk
■ Central America and Caribbean more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

Costa Rica has relatively high resilience to new security threats. It has a long-standing and stable democracy and benefits from high levels of press freedom and human rights protections. It performs above the regional average for the indicators measuring democratic processes and fragile states. However, its ranking on the World Press Freedom Index declined in 2025. In 2023, Costa Rica ranked 59th among the 187 countries most vulnerable to climate change, scoring better on climate change than the regional average. It has made significant efforts towards achieving carbon neutrality by 2050. It already generates its entire electricity consumption from renewables.

EU involvement

The EU maintains strong political relations with Costa Rica. Both parties played an active part in the 1984 San José dialogue in support of the peace process and democratisation efforts in Central America. Costa Rica is a party to the EU–Central America association agreement, in force since May 2024. Under the regional 2021–2027 multiannual indicative programme (MIP) for the Americas and the Caribbean, Costa Rica benefits from EU support on three priorities: decarbonisation and climate change, digitalisation, and migration management. Under its EUROsociAL+ programme, the EU supports public policies in Costa Rica to improve social cohesion and reduce inequality. The EU Global Gateway initiative specifically fosters production of green hydrogen in Costa Rica, conversion of urban buses to electric and development of vaccine production. The EU also supports new regional approaches through triangular cooperation schemes; for instance, it is working with Costa Rica, Colombia and Mexico on strengthening restorative justice.

Côte d'Ivoire

Côte d'Ivoire ranks 82nd on the Normandy Index and is roughly on a par with the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. The country suffers from political polarisation, is exposed to climate change risks, and terrorism and violent conflict remain issues of serious concern.

Background and key issues

Côte d'Ivoire was one of Africa's most stable and prosperous countries following independence. After its first president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, died in 1993, the country plunged into instability and violent conflict between the Christian south and the Muslim north. The 2010 electoral victory of current President Alassane Ouattara, backed by UN and French troops, put an end to the civil conflict. Ouattara secured his fourth mandate on 25 October 2025. The exclusion of Tidjane Thiam from the presidential race was criticised internally and by foreign partners, while rival Ahoua Don Mello, secured Russian support. While President Ouattara keeps close ties with France, Côte d'Ivoire and the UK recently began strategic cooperation.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Cote d'Ivoire   — sub-Saharan Africa

Threat comparison

■ Cote d'Ivoire more at risk   ■ sub-Saharan Africa more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

In recent years, the security situation in the Sahel has degraded significantly due to multiplying attacks by non-state armed groups. Côte d'Ivoire faces a threat from Islamist insurgents on its borders. The risk of terrorist attacks from jihadist organisations such as Malian groups Ansar al-Dine and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib has grown, with a risk of local radicalisation. Since 2020, jihadists have attacked security forces at the northern border with Burkina Faso. Due to its geographical position, the country is vulnerable to organised crime, particularly trafficking in human beings and drugs, as well as to maritime piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. UNHCR statistics show that on 31 August 2025 Côte d'Ivoire counted almost 72 000 asylum-seekers.

EU involvement

The EU's multiannual indicative programme (MIP) for Côte d'Ivoire amounted to €228 million for 2021-2024. The EU agreed priorities to structure the flow of EU development aid to the country from the NDICI-Global Europe Instrument. A total €149.1 million in further funding for peace is provided under the Team Europe peace and stability initiative: the EU contributes €29.4 million, France, Germany and Italy being the other main contributors. Since 2016, Côte d'Ivoire is one of only two West African countries to implement an economic partnership agreement with the EU. The EU deploys a hybrid, civilian-military CSDP mission in the Gulf of Guinea, in support of Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo and Benin (EU Security and Defence Initiative in the Gulf of Guinea).

Democratic Republic of the Congo

The resource-rich Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) ranks 109th on the Normandy Index. In December 2023, President Félix Tshisekedi won a second term, and his Sacred Union of the Nation coalition swept to a majority in parliament. The political landscape remains deeply divided, and the eastern provinces of Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu are rocked by instability.

Background and key issues

Despite the ongoing efforts of the UN stabilisation mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), the 2024 Fragile States Index ranks the DRC in fourth worst place. The DRC is 'highly impacted by terrorism', with the 2025 Global Terrorism Index ranking the country 12th (down from 13th in 2024). In 2024 alone, over 3 million people were displaced in eastern DRC, generating over 1 million refugees in neighbouring countries Uganda and Rwanda. Over 7.3 million Congolese remain internally displaced persons. The UN Security Council resolution 2773 of February 2025 condemns the offensive and advances of the M23 paramilitary group in North Kivu and South Kivu – calling on the Rwanda Defence Force to cease support to M23 and immediately withdraw from the DRC. On 27 June 2025, Congolese and Rwandan Foreign Ministers signed a peace agreement in Washington.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

Legend: Democratic Republic of the Congo — sub-Saharan Africa

Threat comparison

Legend:
- Democratic Republic of the Congo more at risk
- sub-Saharan Africa more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

The death penalty decreed by the DRC military prosecutor against former president Joseph Kabila on treason charges has aggravated tensions in the country. Rwanda systematically denies DRC, UN and Western accusations of its support for M23/AFC paramilitaries. All de-escalation, peace plans and ceasefire attempts, including the Washington peace agreement (the third meeting of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism was held in October) and the Qatar-led negotiations between the DRC and the M23/AFC, have failed to achieve a lasting ceasefire.

EU involvement

The EU financial allocation to DRC under the NDICI–Global Europe Instrument for 2021–2024 amounted to €424 million. In July 2023, a €20 million assistance measure under the European Peace Facility (EPF) was agreed to support the DRC's armed forces. In October 2023, the EU signed a memorandum of understanding on critical raw materials with DRC and Zambia. The EU condemns Rwanda's support for M23. The EU welcomed the peace agreement of June 2025 and allocated €100 million in humanitarian aid to DRC for 2025.

Egypt

Egypt ranks 78th on the Normandy Index. Elected in 2014, 2018 and again in 2023, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi won his third six-year term with 89.6 % of the vote. Egypt has strong energy security and cybersecurity. Regional issues, such as the spillover of the Israel-Hamas war and the Islamic terrorist threat in North Sinai, remain high risk. Increasing debt, inflation and devaluation mean weak economic performance. Despite announced reforms, democratic processes are fragile.

Background and key issues

The 2025 Fragile States Index ranks Egypt as 44th out of 179 due to its human rights record and Islamic terrorism in the country. The military remains the predominant political force. Since 2014, the Wilayat Sinai or Sinai Province terrorist group has conducted a prolonged insurgency against Egyptian authorities. In 2022, the Cairo Criminal Court and the Emergency Supreme State Security sentenced former presidential candidate Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh and the Muslim Brotherhood's former supreme guide Mahmoud Ezzat to 15 years in prison. Egypt holds 77 trillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves, ranking 16th in the world. In line with the REPowerEU plan, the EU and Egypt will accelerate and intensify their energy partnership.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Egypt — MENA

Threat comparison

■ Egypt more at risk   ■ MENA more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

Egypt ranks 170th of 180 countries on the 2025 World Press Freedom Index. Demographics and climate change remain challenges, as the vast majority (98 %) of the population (95 million) lives in the arable Nile valley and delta, which represents only 3 % of landmass. Egypt faces an annual water deficit of around 7 billion cubic metres. Soil salinisation threatens 15 % of the country's farmland. President al-Sisi has pushed for economic and political reform, at the core of which lies Egypt's 'Vision 2030'. Following its drop in value in 2023-2024, the Egyptian pound has stabilised and strengthened by 3.92 % in 2025.

EU involvement

A 2001 association agreement, which entered into force in 2004, forms the legal basis for EU-Egypt relations. The EU-Egypt action plan adopted in 2007 helped develop political, social and economic bilateral relations. Under the revised European Neighbourhood policy, the EU and Egypt adopted partnership priorities that guided the partnership in 2017-2020. In February 2021, the EU adopted a new agenda for the Mediterranean, including a €7 billion investment plan. On 19 June 2022, the 9th meeting of the EU-Egypt Association Council adopted new partnership priorities to guide relations until 2027. A €7.4 billion EU-Egypt strategic and comprehensive partnership was agreed in 2024, to help boost Egypt's faltering economy and combat irregular migration.

Eritrea

Eritrea ranks 116th on the Normandy Index. It suffers from a total lack of democratic practices and political freedom. Relations with most Western countries, including donors, are strained. Eritrea is involved in ongoing regional conflicts, reportedly supporting armed groups in Tigray (Ethiopia) and eastern Sudan.

Background and key issues

President Isaias Afwerki has led a militarised authoritarian regime since independence from Ethiopia in 1993. No national election has been held since, and the 1997 constitution was never fully implemented. The government cracks down on perceived opponents with mass arrests, detaining them for years without trial and in brutal conditions. All citizens between 18 and 50 must undertake national service, theoretically for 18 months. Frequent abuses linked to age limits, duration and conditions have been reported by the UN special rapporteur on Eritrea. Droughts, floods and locust infestations aggravate poverty and food insecurity. Many Eritreans have fled the country to places now entangled in conflict.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

New security and hybrid threats

Threat comparison

Line represents equal level of risk

After Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali took office in 2018, he ended tensions by building a strong alliance with Eritrea's President Isaias Afwerki. However, relations have since soured, with access to the Red Sea becoming a major flashpoint. Eritrean forces supported the offensive in Ethiopia's Tigray region in 2022. After the November 2022 peace agreement between the Tigray People's Liberation Front and the Ethiopian federal government, Eritrea did not withdraw its troops, which committed serious rights violations and war crimes. By March 2025 both countries had mobilised troops along their joint border. Eritrea also reportedly backs armed groups in eastern Sudan. Eritrea has a strong pro-Russian stance. It gave Russia the option to establish a military base in Assab port on the Red Sea (setting up a Russian base in Port Sudan is challenged by the conflict in Sudan). Eritrea rejoined the East African Intergovernmental Authority on Development in June 2023.

EU involvement

While the EU does not have a fully fledged cooperation agreement with Eritrea, it still funds civil society organisations and human rights programmes. The EU provides humanitarian aid to Eritreans in refugee camps in neighbouring countries, notably in Ethiopia. The EU and Eritrea are part of the EU–Horn of Africa migration route initiative, a policy dialogue on the fight against irregular migration.

Ethiopia

Ethiopia ranks 112th on the Normandy Index. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali's first months in office were marked by successful efforts to resolve ongoing disputes with Eritrea and introduce wide-ranging political and economic reforms. However, tensions in several regions and with neighbouring countries have severely affected risk levels in the country.

Background and key issues

With over 80 different ethnic groups, speaking as many languages, Ethiopian politics is structured around the notion of ethnic federalism. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for his efforts to resolve long-standing disputes with Eritrea. The situation in Tigray remains tense despite the peace agreement signed in 2022. Tensions between the central government and several regions have flared up. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is now fully operational and expected to boost the economy, but it has created tensions with Egypt and Sudan. In 2024, 21.4 million Ethiopians needed humanitarian assistance.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Ethiopia — sub-Saharan Africa

Threat comparison

■ Ethiopia more at risk   ■ sub-Saharan Africa more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

Ethiopia's insistence on securing a Red Sea port has created tensions with its neighbours, Somalia and Eritrea. A deal with the Somaliland region for sea access, potentially in exchange for recognising Somaliland's independence, outraged Somalia, while threats by Ethiopia's leader to claim the Eritrean port of Assab alarmed Eritrea. Observers warn that this, coupled with Eritrea fuelling renewed tensions in Tigray, could lead to a war between the two countries. Violent insurgencies in Amhara and Oromia have intensified. The GERD remains a major source of regional tension, particularly with Egypt and Sudan, which view it as a threat to their water security.

EU involvement

Ethiopia is considered a key partner for the renewed EU strategy in the Horn of Africa, adopted in March 2021 but prepared before the outbreak of the Tigray conflict. Due to this conflict, the EU suspended budget support to Ethiopia and increased humanitarian funding. On 24 April 2023, the Council of the EU announced that the EU will progressively return to full engagement with Ethiopia, in line with the peace deal implementation. The 2024-2027 cooperation programme (€650 million) addresses post-conflict needs and structural challenges, around three priority areas: the Green Deal, human development, and governance and peacebuilding. The EU provided €86.55 million in humanitarian support for Ethiopia in 2024, and €46.7 million in 2025 (as of 20 June). At the same time, in April 2024, the EU restricted visas for Ethiopian nationals, due to 'insufficient' Ethiopian cooperation in readmission of its nationals staying illegally in the EU.

Georgia

Georgia ranks 56th on the Normandy Index. It ranks high on cybersecurity and economic crisis, but low on regional conflict and energy security. In November 2024 the government suspended EU negotiation talks, prompting a new spiral of anti-government protests and violent crackdowns.

Background and key issues

Since Georgia's independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, its government has faced separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In 2008, Russia fought a war with Georgia, on the pretext of protecting separatists. Although fighting ended quickly, the causes of the conflict are unresolved and Georgia lost control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Russian Federation now recognises them as sovereign entities, and has established three military bases with at least 15 000 Russian troops. Following the conflictual October 2024 parliamentary elections, where the ruling party (since 2012), Georgian Dream, claimed victory, mass protests demanding new elections immediately erupted across the country. In 2024 the government suspended accession talks.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

Georgia — Eastern Partnership

Threat comparison

■ Georgia more at risk   ■ Eastern Partnership more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

Georgia ranks highest among the Eastern Partnership countries on the Normandy Index economic crisis indicator, having benefited from trade revival and Russian business relocation as a result of harsh EU sanctions against Russia, which Georgia has refused to second. Reforms over the past 15 years have focused on globalising the business sector, boosting economic growth and diversifying trade. While neighbouring Russia, Bulgaria, Azerbaijan and Türkiye remain the main export destinations, Georgia has expanded ties with China, and with the EU through an association agreement, including a deep and comprehensive free trade area. Georgia has no significant fossil fuel resources and scores lower than the regional average on energy security.

EU involvement

The EU continues to support Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, including via the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia (EUSR) and the EU monitoring mission. Georgia was granted EU candidate status in 2023 under certain conditions. In 2024, the government suspended EU accession talks. The December 2024 European Council regretted this and restated the EU's readiness to support the Georgian people's European aspirations.

India

India ranks 91st on the Normandy Index, remaining well placed on cybersecurity, economic crisis and energy insecurity indicators. India has unresolved territorial disputes with China and Pakistan, both nuclear powers, that affect its low WMD ranking.

Background and key issues

India ranks well on the economic crisis indicator, as the country has benefited from growing GDP and receding poverty. The estimated number of Indians living in extreme poverty has decreased to 15 million. However, human rights are deteriorating. India is challenged by inter-religious, inter-caste and inter-ethnic disputes, leading to communal violence. Gender inequality is also a challenge: India ranks 131st out of 148 countries. In 2024, India ranked in the bottom 50 % of countries on the Liberal Democracy Index, declining substantially in the past decade due to discriminatory policies affecting the Muslim population and barriers to political opposition. Tensions with Pakistan, mainly over Kashmir, have produced Islamist terrorist groups.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— India   — South Asia

Threat comparison

■ India more at risk   ■ South Asia more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

Government efforts to limit 'anti-national' discourse have led to India's 151st place on the 2025 World Press Freedom Index. While India is a target of cyber-attacks, it performs strongly on cybersecurity. It scores 14th on the 2025 Global Terrorism Index, and is opposed to signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. India ranked 10th on the 2025 Climate Change Performance Index, with good ratings on emissions and energy use. India was the second biggest importer of military equipment in 2020-2024 after Ukraine and the largest importer from Russia. India did not condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine and is the second biggest importer of Russian crude oil after China.

EU involvement

India and the EU have been strategic partners since 2004. The EU is India's second largest trade partner, accounting for 11.5 % of Indian trade. The EU and India launched an EU-India connectivity partnership, set up an EU-India trade and technology council and signed a memorandum of understanding on the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). In September 2025 the EU presented a new strategic EU-India agenda. The EU and India aim to conclude negotiations for a free trade agreement by the end of 2025. They also aim to achieve an investment protection agreement, and are exploring the creation of an EU-India security and defence partnership. They are launching negotiations on a security of information agreement.

Indonesia

Indonesia ranks 25th on the Normandy Index. Significant economic growth in this populous country of 270 million inhabitants has raised its political prominence in the region, particularly within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Its rise has not been without challenges, namely Islamic fundamentalism, sectarian unrest and slowly eroding democratic processes.

Background and key issues

Indonesia has faced a number of separatist and militant movements since its independence in 1949, and now ranks 30th on the 2025 Global Terrorism Index. A 2005 agreement granting special autonomy brought peace to Aceh province. Indonesian counter-terrorist forces have largely contained Islamist movements such as Jemaah Islamiyah, an Islamist, religiously-motivated and violent extremist group, inspired by anti-Western jihadist ideology. Although law-enforcement activities have significantly impaired the group's leadership over the past decade, it remains a distinct organisation, with a highly compartmentalised structure and 6 000 members, operating primarily in Indonesia.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Indonesia   — Asia-Pacific

New security and hybrid threats

Threat comparison

■ Indonesia more at risk   ■ Asia-Pacific more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

In terms of democratic processes, observers note the country's democratic erosion. Press freedom has also declined, with the country's World Press Freedom Index ranking falling from 111th to 127th in 2024. Indonesia ranks 102nd on the 2024 Fragile States Index. Strong earthquakes and regular volcanic activity, such as the Mount Ibu eruptions in 2024, underline Indonesia's vulnerability to environmental and climate factors. Increasing drought frequency is predicted to threaten Indonesia's monsoon-based agricultural practices and lead to food shortages, while rising ocean levels are predicted to threaten approximately 42 million low-lying households, especially around the capital, Jakarta.

EU involvement

In 2014, Indonesia became the first south-east Asian country to sign a partnership and cooperation agreement with the EU. The EU officially launched negotiations with Indonesia on a free trade agreement in 2016, which was concluded in September 2025. As a middle-income country, Indonesia no longer receives EU bilateral aid, but continues to participate in programmes such as Erasmus+ for higher education. EU funding also supports Indonesia's foreign trade through the ASEAN regional integration support from the EU (ARISE+) facility. The EU and Indonesia conduct a wide range of policy dialogues on topics such as human rights and security. As a regional leader, Indonesia is key to the EU's strategic partnership with ASEAN.

Iran

Iran ranks 119th on the Normandy Index. The country is currently experiencing the deepest and longest economic crisis in its modern history, exacerbated by US economic sanctions, re-imposed at the end of 2018, and the subsequent impact on oil exports, inflation and unemployment.

Background and key issues

Iran has been embroiled in conflict in neighbouring countries, from the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, to Syria, Yemen and Israel today (Iran has refused to recognise Israel's right to exist). The country came under international pressure over its WMD capabilities, leading to the imposition of sanctions by the US, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and EU. The Iran nuclear deal (the joint comprehensive plan of action, or JCPOA) agreed in 2015 offered Iran sanctions relief in exchange for limits on its nuclear programme. However, as the US withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 and re-imposed economic and financial sanctions, Iran began breaching commitments under the deal in 2019.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

New security and hybrid threats

Threat comparison

Amidst the ongoing Israel-Hamas war in Gaza, Israel-Iran tensions have worsened. In 2024, Iran and Israel twice exchanged direct air strikes. On 13 June 2025, Israel launched operation Rising Lion targeting Iran's nuclear and military sites, as well as its top military figures and nuclear scientists. On 21 June 2025, the US also bombed three key Iranian nuclear facilities. A US-Iran-Israel ceasefire was announced on 23 June. On 28 September 2025, all UNSC sanctions were re-imposed on Iran, at the initiative of the three European parties to the JCPOA. The return of sanctions is believed to substantially impact Iran's military programmes and economic situation. The economy has been under strain with declining manufacturing output, power cuts, water shortages and inflation above 40 % in 2025. Real GDP growth shrank to 3 % in 2024 and is expected to be negative (-0.5 %) in 2025. The country continues to rank low on the 2025 Freedom in the World Index, which characterises Iran as not free. Women's rights and the current execution spree are issues of great concern.

EU involvement

The EU played an important role in facilitating the nuclear agreement between Iran and the E3/EU+3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK), plus China, Russia and the USA), endorsed by the UN Security Council in July 2015. In October 2023, in view of Iran's non-compliance with the JCPOA, the EU decided not to lift certain sanctions as originally envisaged. On 29 September 2025, one day after the UNSC resolutions re-imposing sanctions took effect, the EU also re-imposed all the restrictive measures lifted under the JCPOA. The multiannual indicative programme governs relations with Iran 2021-2027. Joint programming is not currently taking place.

Iraq

Iraq ranks 128th on the Normandy Index. Over 20 years after the beginning of the US invasion in 2003, the country suffers from a volatile security situation with a protracted humanitarian and development crisis, characterised by economic crisis, corruption, energy shortage and sectarianism.

Background and key issues

US troops left Iraq in 2011, but returned in 2014 as part of the US-led coalition fighting ISIL/Da'esh. During 2017, over 61 500 square kilometres of territory were liberated from IS across Iraq and Syria, including cities such as Mosul. A full withdrawal of US forces is expected by September 2026. Iran retains significant influence, although recent events suggest this may be weakening as some Iraqi political factions have sought to distance themselves from Tehran ahead of the November 2025 elections. Although armed violence has declined, the terrorist threat and small-scale military operations create a volatile security situation.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Iraq — MENA

New security and hybrid threats

Threat comparison

■ Iraq more at risk   ■ MENA more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

Following parliamentary elections in 2021, a year-long political impasse ended with the appointment of Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al-Sudani in 2022. Iraq is currently experiencing a period of relative domestic calm under al-Sudani's government. Attacks by Iran-aligned militias on US positions, which escalated after October 2023, have largely ceased. These groups were inactive during the June 2025 Iran-Israel conflict, partly to avoid retaliation and reposition for the 2025 general elections. Iraq is one of the Arab countries most vulnerable to climate change, at risk of reduced water and food availability and extreme temperatures. High youth unemployment, corruption and inadequate public services, particularly electricity and water, continue to fuel social unrest and protests.

EU involvement

Under the 2018 EU-Iraq partnership and cooperation agreement, the EU cooperates with Iraq in many areas, including humanitarian assistance, stabilisation, reconstruction, human rights and security. The EU adopted a strategy for Iraq in 2018 to respond to the specific challenges Iraq faces following the territorial defeat of ISIL/Da'esh in 2017. Since 2014, the EU has provided over €591 million in humanitarian aid. Through the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, the EU has allocated a further €165 million for 2021-2027 to support priorities such as economic diversification and democratic governance. The CSDP EU advisory mission, EUAM Iraq, set up in 2017, assists implementation of the Iraqi authorities' security strategy.

Israel

Israel ranks 71st on the Normandy Index. This drop in position can largely be attributed to the Israel-Hamas conflict following the 7 October 2023 terrorist attack, and to confrontation with Iran and Iran-backed groups. While Israel ranks high on resilience against non-traditional threats and cybersecurity, the country's possession of WMD undermines its score.

Background and key issues

Israel has been in conflict with the Palestinians and other Arab neighbours since the 1947 partition of Palestine. Following peace treaties with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994), Israel normalised relations in 2020 with Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan and UAE. However, relations with neighbours Lebanon and Syria deteriorated after the 2023 Hamas attack, and talks on Israel–Saudi relations have halted. The 2024 Freedom in the World Index categorises Israel as free but underlines discrimination against Arab and other minorities. Israel continues its occupation of the West Bank, intensifying settlement activity. It ranks 8th on the 2025 Global Terrorism Index, compared with 2nd in 2024. Other terrorist groups also target Israel, such as Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

Threat comparison

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

Israel's response to the Hamas and Hezbollah attacks on 7–8 October 2023 (Swords of Iron) quickly morphed into a regional war in Gaza and Lebanon. In November 2024, Lebanon and Israel signed a ceasefire deal (also agreed by Hezbollah). The ceasefire remains fragile. A 21-point plan to end the war in Gaza was put forward by US President Trump on 29 September 2025. Moreover, direct confrontation between Israel and Iran ensued after the military degradation of Israel's adversaries and the collapse of Syria's Assad regime, all supported by Iran. Israel is not party to any major treaty governing the non-proliferation of WMD and is non-transparent about its nuclear capabilities, but thought to have a sizeable nuclear weapons arsenal, including ballistic and cruise missiles.

EU involvement

EU-Israel relations are governed by the 2000 EU-Israel association agreement. The European Neighbourhood Policy, the main framework guiding EU's relations with Israel, promotes Israel's integration into European policies and programmes. The EU advocates a two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including ending Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories. In response to the situation in Gaza, on 28 July 2025, the Commission issued a proposal for a partial suspension of Israel's participation in Horizon Europe. On 17 September 2025, the Commission proposed the suspension of trade concessions with Israel under the EU-Israel association agreement.

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan ranks 34th on the Normandy Index. Stability has returned following internal crisis in 2022, but the slow pace of reforms and democratic processes, socio-economic inequality, the country's geopolitical situation and climate change remain challenges for the future.

Background and key issues

Kazakhstan gained independence in 1991. Its first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, served five terms, stepping down in 2019, but retaining significant influence until 2022, when constitutional reforms instigated by his successor, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, removed his remaining powers. Kazakhstan is dominated by the ruling party Amanat, and political opposition is routinely repressed. Parliamentary and local elections were held under a reformed system in 2023, but Amanat retained its majority. In September 2025, President Tokayev announced an initiative to reform the parliament into a unicameral body. According to the VDEM democracy report, the country is not a liberal democracy. Although growing and diversifying, the Kazakh economy is highly dependent on oil exports, which poses an economic risk and potential source of instability. A key challenge for Kazakhstan is managing its relationship with its neighbour, Russia, as around 23 % of the Kazakh population is ethnic Russian.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Kazakhstan — Russia and Eurasia

Threat comparison

■ Kazakhstan more at risk ■ Russia and Eurasia more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

Internal factors driving instability include the slow pace of political reforms, high inflation and discontent over inequality, the cost of living and corruption. In 2022, Kazakhstan saw major civil unrest when the removal of fuel subsidies sparked anti-government protests across the country, escalating into violence and killing at least 238 people. Human rights organisations are still calling for greater accountability for violations during the protests. The UN and Council of Europe welcomed the abolition of the death penalty and criminalisation of domestic violence. The country scores highly on resilience against terrorism, 100th on the Global Terrorism Index.

EU involvement

The EU has supported Kazakhstan's development since independence in 1991 and remains its largest trade partner. In 2015, the Union signed an enhanced partnership and cooperation agreement, the first with a Central Asian partner. The agreement came into force in 2020 and enables cooperation in key areas, such as justice and home affairs. The EU and Kazakhstan have a strategic partnership on raw materials, batteries and renewable hydrogen. The country is covered by the EU's Central Asia strategy and followed by Special Representatives for Central Asia. The EU and Kazakhstan are also implementing agreements on sustainable trade, digitalisation and educational exchanges concluded during the EU-Central Asia Summit in April 2025.

Kosovo*

Kosovo, with a population of 1.5 million, ranks 13th on the Normandy Index. It unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in 2008. Kosovo's prospect of a European future has been affirmed at EU-Western Balkans summits. It ranks lower than the overall European average, in particular on democratic processes and resilience to disinformation indicators.

Background and key issues

Kosovo is a potential candidate for EU accession. Despite some success in implementing the EU-Kosovo stabilisation and association agreement, in force since 2016, the country's path to EU integration has proved rather slow, mainly owing to internal political instability and an unresolved bilateral dispute with Serbia. On 9 February 2025, Kosovo held elections to choose the 120 members of its assembly. The winner was Albin Kurti's centre-left Vetëvendosje (Self-Determination Movement) with 42.3 % of the vote. At the local elections of November 2025, the opposition won in the cities of Pristina and Prizren, and Kurti's party retained Gjilan.

New security and hybrid threats

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

Threat comparison

In 2025, Kosovo continues to be negatively affected by a highly polarised political atmosphere reflected in a failed attempt to win a confidence vote in the Assembly on 26 October. This was the first time since 2001 that a prime minister nominee has failed to be approved by the Assembly. Kosovo President Osmani called for snap elections on 28 December. According to the Commission 2025 report, Kosovo is at an early stage of developing a well-functioning judicial system and combating corruption and organised crime. Tensions with the Serb minority remain a concern despite advances in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, such as the 2023 Ohrid agreement. However, earlier engagements, such as the Brussels 2013 agreement and establishment of the Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities, have not yet been implemented by Kosovo authorities.

EU involvement

Kosovo has the prospect of a European future, as stated at the 2003 EU-Western Balkans summit in Thessaloniki. The European Future for Kosovo communication (2005) confirmed EU commitment, despite challenges, in particular normalising relations with Serbia. On 18 March 2023, Kosovo and Serbia further engaged to implement the annex to the EU-proposed agreement on the path to normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia. The EU contributes to stability in Kosovo through the EULEX rule of law mission and its special representative, Peter Sørensen, since January 2025.

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Lebanon

Lebanon ranks 120th on the Normandy Index. The country is emerging from a deep economic crisis that saw its currency collapse and has fostered widespread discontent since 2019. The explosion that destroyed large parts of Beirut in August 2020 epitomises the past decline of the country's public and political institutions. The formation of a new government in early 2025 offers a chance for reform, and a ceasefire has halted the intense 2024 conflict between Hezbollah and Israel.

Background and key issues

Lebanon is one of the Middle East's rare democracies, but plagued by dysfunction due to corrupt sectarian elites and foreign interference. The country's conflict dates back at least to the civil war that erupted in 1975. A small state, Lebanon is at the centre of regional power struggles led today by Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Israeli invasion of 1982, the 2005 assassination of then Prime Minister Rafic-al Hariri, ongoing Iranian support for Hezbollah, and the spillover of fighting and refugees from the Syrian crisis have perpetuated instability. The fall of Syria's Assad regime in December 2024 and the military degradation of Hezbollah in its 2024 war with Israel have weakened the Iran-backed group and its influence. The new government has set the disarmament of Hezbollah as an objective.

### Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Lebanon — MENA

New security and hybrid threats

Threat comparison

■ Lebanon more at risk   ■ MENA more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

Lebanon has endured one of the world's worst economic downturns since 2019. The situation deteriorated steadily and the currency lost 98 % of its value, although it has stabilised since mid-2023. Following a contraction of around 7-8 % in 2024, real GDP is forecast to rebound by 3.9-5.5 % in 2025. Average inflation has fallen sharply from 221 % in 2023 to 45 % in 2024, with a further decrease to around 15 % projected for 2025. The political paralysis that left the country without a president for over two years ended with the election of Lebanon's army chief Joseph Aoun in January 2025. A new 'reform and rescue' government led by Prime Minister Nawaf Salam (former president of the International Court of Justice) was formed in February 2025, with a key priority being to re-engage with the International Monetary Fund.

EU involvement

The EU has allocated more than €3.5 billion in assistance to Lebanon since 2011. This support is people-centred and pursues reforms in line with the reform, recovery and reconstruction framework (3RF). In addition, the EU allocated over €1 billion in humanitarian aid to respond to the urgent needs of the population, both Lebanese and refugees. Bilateral assistance is allocated under the European Neighbourhood Policy. Multiannual programming for Lebanon under the Global Europe Instrument focuses on funding to build a sustainable state, reinforce the economy, and ensure security and stability.

Libya

Libya ranks 99th on the Normandy Index, with a below-average score for the MENA region in violent conflict, fragile state and crime. It is above the regional average for energy insecurity. Since the 2020 Berlin Conference on Libya and the 2021 approval of the interim government, it is hoped that a political process leading to elections could bring Libya closer to a democratic transition.

Background and key issues

Libya has been divided into rival military and political administrations since 2014, based respectively in Tripoli (UN-recognised government), and Tobruk. Libya's third civil war in a decade began when Khalifah Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA) launched an offensive on Tripoli in 2019. Leader of the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) Fayez al-Sarraj turned to Türkiye for military help. On 5 February 2021, Mohamed Younis al-Menfi was chosen by the GNA as the president of the Libyan presidential council at the Libyan political dialogue forum. The failed December 2021 presidential elections suspended political processes. Rifts resurfaced in February 2022, following the appointment of Fathi Bashagha as the new prime minister. The High National Elections Commission opened voter registration in June 2024 for municipal elections; the second phase of municipal elections was on 16 August 2025 and the third on 15 October 2025.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Libya — MENA

Threat comparison

■ Libya more at risk   ■ MENA more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

The UN estimates economic losses due to the civil war at €400 billion and rebuilding costs at €500 billion. Despite the cessation of violence, foreign military personnel and mercenaries remain in Libya, supporting both sides. In April 2021, the UNSC adopted resolution 2570 (2021), urging member states to withdraw 'all foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya without delay'. In July 2022, the National Oil Corporation suspended services at several oil ports. Threats of terrorism, human trafficking and illegal migration are high. In 2023, the LNA discovered two and a half tonnes of uranium ore at the Chad border.

EU involvement

The EU is committed to the Berlin Process under the auspices of the UN. Following the 2020 Berlin Conference on Libya, the EU launched a new military mission, Operation Irini, for implementing the UNSC-imposed arms embargo. The EU integrated border assistance mission in Libya supports the Libyan authorities. Libya has received support under the Neighbourhood Policy Instrument and the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. A revised strategy for the Southern Neighbourhood was adopted in 2021. In May 2024, Libyan Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah met European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in Brussels to discuss security, migration and energy policy.

Mali

Mali ranks 133rd out of 138 on the Normandy Index. The military junta leading the country since 2021 has postponed democratic elections to 2027. Mali faces continued threats from violent jihadist groups, as well as climate change-related challenges, including increased resource scarcity.

Background and key issues

Mali, together with Burkina Faso and Niger, established the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and withdrew from the West African community ECOWAS in January 2024. Mali is the fourth-most country in the world impacted by terrorism. Extremist groups active in the country include JNIM, which killed 322 people in 77 attacks in 2024, and the Islamic State in the Sahel. Protracted conflict has aggravated the humanitarian crisis. Out of a population of 24 million, over 6 million people need humanitarian assistance and 737 000 have fled their homes (including 402 000 internally displaced people). Around 1.5 million are estimated to need emergency food assistance. Thousands of schools and a quarter of health facilities have closed. Blockades severely restrict humanitarian access to over 1 million people.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Mali   — sub-Saharan Africa

New security and hybrid threats

Threat comparison

■ Mali more at risk   ■ sub-Saharan Africa more at risk

Mali's transitional authorities decided to terminate defence cooperation with France and the Canadian-European Takuba task force in 2022, and demanded that the UN mission MINUSMA leave in 2023. EU training mission EUTM Mali closed in 2024 while the civilian capacity-building mission EUCAP Sahel Mali has been scaled down. At the same time, Mali strengthened its links with Russia. In 2024, the Malian authorities put an end to the 2015 Algiers peace agreement with northern separatists, leading to renewed fighting. Russian paramilitary companies supporting Malian forces have been accused of killing and abusing civilians. They also faced serious military defeats from rebel armed groups reportedly informed and equipped by Ukraine. Freedom of expression is routinely violated and disinformation campaigns, mainly Russia-led, are worsening instability. In July 2025, the transitional parliament granted coup leader Assimi Goita a presidential mandate until 2030, renewable without limits.

EU involvement

The EU has kept dialogue open with the transitional government and not suspended all aid. Even after the 2021 coup, the European Peace Facility financed the Malian armed forces to support their combat against insurgent groups. Direct support for the most vulnerable populations has been maintained. In 2024 the €34.7 million EU humanitarian aid to Mali mainly targeted displaced and vulnerable populations in conflict-affected and fragile areas.

Mauritania

Mauritania ranks 62nd on the Normandy Index. It is considered less at risk on crime, WMD and terrorism than the regional average. One of Africa's newest oil producers, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania bridges the Arab Maghreb and western sub-Saharan Africa.

Background and key issues

Mauritania is one of the poorest countries in the world, with GDP per capita at US$2 082 (World Bank, 2024). In recent decades, its political life has been marked by several military coups, the most recent led by General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz in 2008, followed by his election in 2009. In June 2019, Mauritania saw the first peaceful transfer of power since independence in 1960, with the election of the ruling party candidate and former defence minister, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani. Despite increasing numbers of attacks in the Sahel, Mauritania has proved to be remarkably resilient against jihadism.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Mauritania — sub-Saharan Africa

New security and hybrid threats

Threat comparison

■ Mauritania more at risk ■ sub-Saharan Africa more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

Parliamentary elections were held in Mauritania in 2023, alongside regional and local elections. The ruling party El-Insaf (Justice/Equity) secured a majority in the national assembly. Failure to eradicate slavery, despite its abolition in 1981, explains the country's particularly low score on state legitimacy. Mauritania faces the second highest risk of drought according to the Global Risk Index, as it experiences recurring cycles of drought that exacerbate resource scarcity and food insecurity. The country passed its first data privacy laws in 2017, but is still in the early stages of addressing cybersecurity, ranking 145th on the Global Cybersecurity Index. Mauritania ranks 33rd in the 2025 World Press Freedom Index. In 2020, President Ghazouani appointed a national commission for press reform, to consolidate press freedom. Population displacement, exacerbated by the crisis in neighbouring Mali, extreme weather, and food and nutrition crises caused a need for humanitarian assistance for over 844 000 people in 2023. Over 30 % of the population lives in poverty.

EU involvement

The EU adopted a new strategy for the Sahel in 2021. Beyond military engagement, this strengthens the political dimension and emphasises sustainable development. Mauritania benefits from a duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market for 'everything but arms'. The European Development Fund provided up to €160 million from 2014 to 2020. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa supports conflict prevention projects, contributing €79 million since 2017. The EU also supports the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service in the country. The 2024 migration partnership is backed by €210 million in aid.

Mexico

Mexico ranks 101st on the Normandy Index. Since her election victory in June 2024 Claudia Sheinbaum is the first female president in the country's 200-year history. Mexico continues to suffer high levels of violent conflict and crime. It remains one of the world's most dangerous and deadly countries for journalists and human rights defenders.

Background and key issues

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) ranked Mexico as one of the most dangerous countries for journalists. High homicide levels largely mirror trends in organised crime-related violence, as criminal groups battle for control of smuggling routes. Between 25 % and 50 % of total homicides reported by the Mexican government were likely linked to organised crime. Sheinbaum's administration has been distancing itself from former President López Obrador's so-called 'hugs, not bullets' policy by designing a more focused approach to combating organised crime including strengthening the National Guard, intelligence-gathering and inter-agency coordination.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Mexico   — Central America and Caribbean

Threat comparison
■ Mexico more at risk
■ Central America and Caribbean more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

The second Trump administration has called for the 'total elimination' of drug cartels, declared a national emergency on its southern border related to drug trafficking and unauthorised migration, and imposed a 25 % tariff on Mexico. The US has expanded its military presence at the southern border and reportedly issued a directive that would enable US military action against drug cartels designated as terrorist groups, including in Mexico. According to Europol, Mexican criminal actors and EU-based criminal networks cooperate on trafficking these drugs from Latin America to the EU. The UNODC 2023 Global Report on Cocaine notes the global supply of cocaine is at record levels.

EU involvement

The EU has a long-standing comprehensive partnership with Mexico through the EU-Mexico economic partnership, political coordination and cooperation agreement, signed in 1997 and entered into force in 2000. On 17 January 2025, the EU concluded negotiations on a modernised global agreement (MGA) with Mexico. On 3 September 2025, the Commission adopted proposals for Council decisions on the signature and conclusion of the MGA and of the interim trade agreement. In 2008, the EU agreed a strategic partnership with Mexico that introduced new high-level dialogue issues. Negotiations concluding a working arrangement between Mexican authorities and Europol resulted in an agreement that entered into force in July 2020.

Moldova

Moldova ranks 40th on the Normandy Index and performs well on democratic processes. However, Russia's war on Ukraine and its hybrid actions against Moldova have negative impacts on the country, as proved during the 2024 and 2025 elections. To counter this, Moldova is progressing on its path to European integration and focused on increasing its resilience and energy security.

Background and key issues

The 2024 presidential elections and referendum on a constitutional amendment supporting Moldova's EU membership, as well as September 2025 parliamentary elections were accompanied by unprecedented Russian hybrid campaigns targeting democratic processes. Incumbent president, pro-European Maia Sandu, was elected for her second term, while her Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) received 50.2 % of the vote in the September 2025 parliamentary elections. Consequently, all Moldovan branches of government (including the president, the government and the parliament) are currently aligned and support a shared, ambitious reform agenda, with European integration the main objective. Moldova is part of a frozen conflict over the Russian–backed breakaway region of Transnistria. Moldova also welcomed the highest number of Ukrainian refugees per capita of any country.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Moldova — Europe

Threat comparison

■ Moldova more at risk   ■ Europe more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

While not thought to be in imminent military danger, Moldova remains under constant Russian hybrid attack. The elections of 2024 and 2025 were accompanied by Russian hybrid operations, which included illegal funding, disinformation and cyber-attacks. In March 2023, a reportedly Russian intelligence document revealing a 10-year plan to take control of Moldova was made public. Russia also used its gas deliveries to Moldova to blackmail the country. To reduce its dependence, Moldova started importing natural gas through reverse flow from the Slovak–Ukraine border and through the Trans-Balkan corridor in 2022. Moldova increased its electricity independence when its grids were synchronised with the Continental European grid in 2022.

EU involvement

Moldova and EU signed an association agreement and a DCFTA in 2014, and a Security and Defence Partnership in 2024. Support for Moldova from the EU is estimated at €1.2 billion in grants since 2021. This is supplemented by the Reform and Growth Facility worth almost €1.9 billion until 2027. On 3 March 2022, President Sandu signed Moldova's formal application for EU membership. In June 2022, Moldova received candidate country status, and accession negotiations began on 25 June 2024, with the first intergovernmental conference.

Mongolia

Mongolia ranks 30th on the Normandy Index, performing well on violent conflict, terrorism threat and energy insecurity indicators. It performs comparatively poorly on cybersecurity and crime.

Background and key issues

Given Mongolia's wealth in natural resources, one of the driving forces of its economic development is mining and extraction. Mongolia's large dependence on mining exports, high levels of external debt and exposure to external shocks in the form of global commodity price fluctuations, create considerable risk of macroeconomic vulnerabilities. Corruption, often related to mining, is endemic, with Mongolia ranking merely 114th of 180 countries on the 2024 Transparency International Index. Corruption claims triggered the collapse of the coalition government in May 2025. Despite Mongolia's democratic credentials, it ranks only 102nd on the 2025 World Press Freedom Index, up from 109th in 2024.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Mongolia   — Russia and Eurasia

Threat comparison

■ Mongolia more at risk   ■ Russia and Eurasia more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

Mongolia is one of the countries most affected by climate change. Overgrazing and over-extraction exacerbate climate change impacts which include changes in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events. Mongolia performs poorly on criminality indicators. It ranked 148th of 193 countries on the 2023 Organised Crime Index. In recent years, Mongolia has experienced a surge in cyber-attacks carried out by Chinese and Russian hackers. In 2023, Mongolia complemented its 2021 legal cybersecurity framework by issuing a national cybersecurity strategy.

EU involvement

Diplomatic relations between the EU and Mongolia were established in 1989 and are now based on the EU–Mongolia partnership and cooperation agreement (PCA). The EU focuses on support for vulnerable groups and empowerment of civil society. The fight against child labour and other forms of child exploitation has figured high on the EU's priorities. Other priorities include gender equality, non-discrimination, the rule of law, building resilient, inclusive and democratic societies, and human rights and democracy. In 2020, the EU launched its first budget support programme with UN development programme technical support, to boost employment and improve public finance transparency. The Commission's 2021-2027 multiannual indicative programme prioritises green sustainable development and democratic and economic development. In April 2025, the EU and Mongolia held their annual human rights dialogue, a development cooperation working group meeting and a joint committee meeting under the EU–Mongolia PCA. Bilateral cooperation on connectivity, digitalisation and the green transition benefits from EU Global Gateway support.

Morocco

Morocco ranks 50th on the Normandy Index, with an above-average score for the MENA region on terrorism and cybersecurity. While Morocco is a relatively stable country, irregular migration and regional disputes remain a weakness, as do its energy insecurity and democratic processes.

Background and key issues

The Moroccan government announced a US$12.8 billion Economic Relaunch Pact in 2020. However, austerity measures under the 2021 finance bill increased social discontent and protests. In July 2022, protests were organised in several cities following the deaths of at least 23 migrants at the border with the Spanish enclave of Melilla in June 2022. Another wave of protests erupted on 27 September 2025, after the Gen Z movement urged Moroccans to peacefully take to the streets and demand increased spending for public health care and education and an end to corruption. Economic growth remains solid; for 2024, GDP growth is estimated at 3.1 %, as non-agricultural sectors expanded, despite the country's sixth year of drought that has dampened farming output.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Morocco   — MENA

Threat comparison

■ Morocco more at risk   ■ MENA more at risk


Line represents equal level of risk

For 2025, the IMF estimates 4.4 % GDP growth.

New security and hybrid threats

Due to the pandemic, Morocco's economy slipped into its first recession in 2020 since 1995. A GDP fall of 6.3 % was also due to the impact of drought on agricultural revenue. Following the post-pandemic inflation spike (6.6 % in 2022), inflation decelerated sharply, falling from over 8 % year-on-year in early 2023 to around 3 % in 2024. This allowed the Bank al-Maghrib to cut rates in 2024 to support recovery. Morocco is a net energy importer: energy imports, including from Algeria with which relations were disrupted in 2021, account for over 90 % of its total energy consumption.

EU involvement

EU-Morocco relations are based on the association agreement, which created a free trade area between the EU and Morocco in 2000. The Association Council frames the EU-Morocco relationship. The 2019 joint declaration gave new impetus to the partnership. The EU has devoted €1.5 billion to overall bilateral cooperation with Morocco in 2014-2020 (€2.1 billion including migration support). The Commission provided €177 million in budget support for 2024-2028. In 2022, the EU and Morocco signed a Green Partnership. The Commission has had a mandate to negotiate a readmission agreement since 2000. Between 2003 and 2010, 15 rounds of negotiations took place but officially stalled because Morocco refused to accept the readmission of third-country nationals transiting through its territory. More recently, the New Pact for the Mediterranean, adopted on 16 October 2025, offers a historic opportunity to reshape Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in an innovative and forward-looking framework.

Mozambique

Mozambique ranks 105th on the Normandy Index. Over the last decade, its overall level of fragility has deteriorated, partly due to the jihadist network threat in the Cabo Delgado province, which rebounded in 2025. The country faces other serious threats from lack of political participation and inclusion, climate change and cyber insecurity.

Background and key issues

The independence movement from the Portuguese began in the 1960s, with the establishment of the Liberation Front of Mozambique (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, Frelimo) in 1962. Following independence in 1975, a guerrilla war against the one-party system established by Frelimo ravaged the country between 1977 and 1992. A 1992 peace agreement temporarily ended the conflict. Succeeding Felipe Nyusi, President Daniel Chapo won the much-contested 2024 elections. The country is one of the poorest in the world, with World Bank GDP per capita estimates of US$608. More than half the population live in poverty. 56 % are Christian and 18 % Muslim, the former being predominant in the south and the latter in the north. The IMF staff visit to the country in August 2025 might signal future IMF support to Mozambique.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Mozambique — sub-Saharan Africa

Threat comparison

■ Mozambique more at risk ■ sub-Saharan Africa more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

President Chapo managed to overcome the political opposition. However, ruling party Frelimo remains unpopular and the President's own position in the party remains weak. Islamist insurgency has destabilised the northern province of Cabo Delgado since 2017. Since July 2021, Southern African Development Community (SADC) troops and 2 500 Rwandan troops deployed to Cabo Delgado have helped stabilise the situation. Chapo signed a new agreement in Kigali in September 2025 to formalise the ongoing Rwandan military mission, while new jihadist attacks have taken place in the north Afungi region. The 2025 Global Terrorism Index ranks the country 17th.

EU involvement

Mozambique ratified the EU–SADC economic partnership agreement in 2017. In November 2020, the EU restored its budget support to the country after a four-year suspension in response to widespread corruption. In 2021, the EU and Mozambique agreed common objectives for development cooperation under the NDICI-Global Europe. The EU established a military training mission in Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique). In May 2024, the Council decided to gradually transform it into an assistance mission (EUAM Mozambique). Through the European Peace Facility, the EU has adopted various assistance measures totalling €144 million. The EU deployed an electoral observation mission in Mozambique for the 2024 elections.

Myanmar

Myanmar ranks 122nd on the Normandy Index, a steep fall in rank since the February 2021 military coup which brought violence and chaos. The country has long been plagued by poverty, ethnic conflict and human rights abuses. Myanmar performs badly on climate change and disinformation.

Background and key issues

Tensions between the Bamar majority and over 135 ethnic groups have caused decades of instability in Myanmar. Conflict between ethnic armed groups and government forces has cost thousands of lives and displaced hundreds of thousands. Some 50 years of military rule have seen horrific human rights abuses and grinding poverty. Constitutional reforms that began in 2008, and the election of a civilian government in 2015, looked like positive developments. Democratic reform also brought economic development, with the World Bank noting a 10-fold increase in GDP per capita between 2000 and 2020 (from €146 to €1 450). In 2016-2017, the military killed thousands of people from the persecuted Rohingya minority, who live in the northern zones of Rakhine State, resulting in mass exodus of refugees. Genocide charges were brought against Myanmar at the ICJ in 2019 (*The Gambia* v *Myanmar*).

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Myanmar   — Asia-Pacific

Threat comparison

■ Myanmar more at risk   ■ Asia-Pacific more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

The February 2021 military coup ended five years of uneasy co-existence between the civilian government and the powerful armed forces. Civilian leaders, including Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, were imprisoned or placed under house arrest. In December 2022, Aung San Suu Kyi was sentenced by a military court to a further seven years in prison, bringing her total sentence to 33 years. In response to the military coup, and aligning with the Council conclusions from February 2021, the EU does not acknowledge the legitimacy of the military junta, as embodied by the State Administration Council. Consequently, there is no formal partnership between the EU and the de facto authorities in Myanmar.

EU involvement

In 2021, the EU suspended all activities that might be perceived as supporting or legitimising the military authorities. After a careful review of the development assistance portfolio, the EU, in consultation with its Member States, adopted a 'back-to-basics' approach dedicated to supporting the most vulnerable communities by collaborating directly with civil society. Under four separate special measures between 2021 and 2024, a total of €219 million was allocated to support the Myanmar people. Further funding of €99 million for the 2025-2027 period is being financed under the regional multiannual indicative programme for Asia and the Pacific.

New Zealand

New Zealand ranks 4th on the Normandy Index. It performs better than the Asia–Pacific average on most indicators apart from energy security and cybersecurity, and scores notably well on the management of economic crises and democratic processes.

Background and key issues

New Zealand has a long-standing democratic tradition in the form of a parliamentary system, enhanced by strong levels of education and high per capita GDP, which the World Bank puts at US$48 747 in 2024. On the latest Human Development Index, it ranked 17th out of the 191 countries measured, immediately following Canada. The Economist Intelligence Unit's 2024 Democracy Index ranks New Zealand second overall, and first equal with Norway on electoral process, pluralism and political participation. In addition, it is the third most stable country according to the Normandy Index, as measured by the fragile states indicator. This is due to strong perceptions of state legitimacy, effective public services and low levels of external intervention. New Zealand performs well on most indicators of traditional conflict, and ranks 94th on the 2025 Global Terrorism Index, a significant improvement from the preceding year (50th in 2024).

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

New Zealand — Asia–Pacific

Threat comparison

■ New Zealand more at risk ■ Asia–Pacific more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

Thanks to its resilient democratic institutions, high standard of living and public services, and extreme remoteness from the world's most densely populated regions, New Zealand has long been relatively insulated from traditional security and hybrid threats. Its society enjoys a high level of press freedom, ranked 16th on the 2025 Press Freedom Index. However, a high level of trade dependence on China, and concerns that growing US–China strategic rivalry could spill over into the South Pacific, have made the strategic environment less benign.

EU involvement

The EU's bilateral political relationship with New Zealand is based on the 2016 partnership for relations and cooperation (PARC). The agreement provides a framework for regular political dialogue, including consultations at ministerial, senior official and parliamentary levels. In 2018, the EU launched negotiations with New Zealand on a bilateral free trade agreement. Negotiations concluded in June 2022, and the FTA entered into force on 1 May 2024. The EU is New Zealand's third largest trading partner after China and Australia, and the second largest source of FDI for New Zealand. Within the EU, important bilateral trade partners for New Zealand include Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands. New Zealand has participated in the EU's anti-piracy mission off the Horn of Africa, EUNAVFOR Atalanta, and its EUPOL police mission in Afghanistan, and is an important EU development aid partner in the South Pacific.

Niger

Niger ranks 118th on the Normandy Index. Violent jihadist groups proliferate amid regional instability, causing a surge in refugees and internally displaced people. This compounds the already dire effects of climate change on access to resources, a further trigger for conflict. The 2023 coup put an end to Western partners' strategy to invest in Niger as the main security hub in the region.

Background and key issues

Niger is one of the most fragile countries and most vulnerable to climate change. Climate change and poorly adapted agricultural practices, combined with rapid population growth, contribute to scarcity. Food insecurity and population displacement across the country exacerbate tensions between communities. Violent extremist groups (including the Islamic State in the Sahel, JNIM, Boko Haram and the Islamic State-West Africa) exploit these tensions, especially in the border areas with Chad and Nigeria (Lake Chad) and with Mali and Burkina Faso (Liptako-Gourma). A military coup removed President Mohamed Bazoum from office in July 2023. Niger, together with Burkina Faso and Mali, established the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and withdrew from the West African community ECOWAS in January 2024.

Peace Profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

Niger — sub-Saharan Africa

New security and hybrid threats

Threat comparison

■ Niger more at risk   ■ sub-Saharan Africa more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

Following the coup, Niger repudiated deals on French and US military bases and EU CSDP missions on its soil. This led to a sharp rise in attacks in 2024 (+94 %, 930 deaths), despite increased military cooperation with Russia. The presence of Russian and Turkish mercenaries is often linked to the involvement of Russian and Turkish gold-mining companies. Niger's uranium (6 % of the world's resources) still overwhelmingly benefits foreign interests, mainly China, despite nationalisation efforts curtailing French control; Russia and Niger are discussing building the first West African nuclear power plant. Freedom of expression is routinely violated and disinformation campaigns, mainly Russia-led, are worsening instability. In February 2025, a national dialogue (*assises nationales*) organised by the junta recommended that the transition period be prolonged until 2030.

EU involvement

Following the coup, the December 2023 revocation of the EU civilian capacity-building mission EUCAP Sahel Niger and the EU military partnership mission in Niger signalled a decline in EU–Sahel security cooperation. Similarly, Niger repealed its policy to combat irregular migration, drafted with EU support. The partnership with the state and security forces was put on hold but direct support for the most vulnerable populations, and emergency and life-saving aid, have been maintained.

Nigeria

Nigeria ranks 127th on the Normandy Index. It is considered more at risk than the sub-Saharan African average and is particularly vulnerable to terrorism. Ethnic tensions date back to colonial times: the 1967-1970 civil war was primarily about the equitable distribution of oil revenues between ethnic groups.

Background and key issues

In March 2023, Bola Tinubu, of the ruling party, won the February 2023 presidential elections. Nigeria, the leading West African force, only signed the Samoa Agreement (the partnership agreement signed in November 2023 between the EU, its Member States and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States) in June 2024 and issued a declaration invalidating any provisions that are inconsistent with Nigerian laws (like the 2014 law forbidding same-sex relationships). Despite mediation efforts by the Togolese president, tensions remain with neighbouring Niger.

New security and hybrid threats

Threat comparison

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

Nigeria ranked 6th on the 2025 Global Terrorism Index (8th in 2024 and 2023, and 5th in 2022). Nigeria ranks 15th on the 2025 Fragile States Index. Despite being Africa's biggest economy by GDP, Nigeria's economic situation is fragile, owing to its over-reliance on oil. After experiencing its deepest recession since the 1980s in 2020, Nigeria's economy has returned to moderate growth. Nigeria ranks 122nd of 180 countries on the 2025 World Press Freedom Index, losing 10 places since 2024. The 2023 elections saw strict controls, attacks on journalists and arbitrary arrests. Organised oil crime (encompassing theft, illegal refining, sale and the use of children and women as human shields) affects up to 20 % of Nigeria's oil output and perpetuates corruption.

EU involvement

The EU continues to fund an initiative grouping several Lake Chad countries (the multinational joint task force (MNJTF), which was, however, weakened by the announced withdrawal of Niger in March 2025) to combat Boko Haram. In 2021, Nigeria and the EU agreed new shared objectives for development cooperation under the NDICI-Global Europe Instrument for the next seven years. The EU negotiated a regional economic partnership agreement with Nigeria and other West African countries, but Nigeria remains reluctant to implement it. In 2022, a Team Europe initiative, the Nigeria Green Economy project, committed €1.3 billion to the energy sector. The EU deployed an election observation mission for the 2023 presidential elections. The Nigeria-EU senior officials trade and investment dialogue (TID) was launched on 30 September 2025 in Abuja.

North Korea

North Korea ranks 125th on the Normandy Index, clearly below the Asia-Pacific average. Since 1948, talks on reunifying the Korean peninsula have consistently failed. The country performs very poorly on democratic process, fragile state, disinformation and WMD.

Background and key issues

A vestige of its 'military first' policy, North Korea has the third largest military on active duty in the world, with a standing army of 1 469 000 soldiers. In 2013, this policy was replaced with the 'progress in tandem' policy, which emphasised economic progress and guaranteed security against South Korean or American incursion by nuclear development. The country has nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes, and is believed to have chemical and biological weapons capabilities. Its nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles are considered capable of reaching Japan, South Korea and the US. The country has used cyber-attacks and cyber theft to amass up to US$1.3 billion in foreign and virtual currency, circumventing international sanctions. North Korea ranks 40th on the 2024 Fragile States Index, with a particularly weak score for state legitimacy. In terms of democratic processes, North Korea is one of the worst performers in the world. Thousands of political prisoners are interned in prison camps.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

North Korea — Asia-Pacific

Threat comparison

North Korea more at risk — Asia-Pacific more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

North Korea ranks bottom (180th) on the 2023 Global Press Freedom Index. The state security apparatus is extensive, controlling citizens' residence, travel, employment, clothing, food and family life. The population is classified according to their 'songbun' (a status system assessing citizens' loyalty to the government based on family history). The nuclear programme, ideology of self-reliance, mismanagement and corruption impede long-term growth. In July 2022, North Korea recognised non-government controlled Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine as independent states (the third country to do so, after Russia and Syria).

EU involvement

The EU has maintained diplomatic relations with North Korea since 2001, but has no delegation in Pyongyang. The EU applies sanctions against Pyongyang, implementing the UN Security Council Resolutions and adopting autonomous restrictive measures (the latest of 21 April 2022). The 9 September 2025 EU statement at the IAEA stated: 'The EU condemns the DPRK's unlawful and destabilising actions that undermine regional and international peace and security. We urge the DPRK to comply with its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions and abandon all its nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, its ballistic missile programmes and its existing nuclear programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.'

North Macedonia

North Macedonia ranks 26th on the Normandy Index. It performs below the European average on democratic processes, fragile states and cybersecurity but outperforms on terrorism and WMD.

Background and key issues

North Macedonia gained independence from the former Yugoslavia in 1991. Today, the country scores within the top quartile of countries on the democratic processes indicator. Through the June 2018 Prespa Agreement, the country changed its name to the Republic of North Macedonia, in exchange for Greece ending its veto on its EU and NATO accession. Following the signature of North Macedonia's accession protocol in February, the country officially joined NATO as the alliance's 30th member in March 2020. North Macedonia's assembly elected the current composition of the government of the Republic on 28 January 2024.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

—— North Macedonia —— Europe

New security and hybrid threats

Threat comparison

■ North Macedonia more at risk ■ Europe more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

North Macedonia is the only middle-income country ranked by the World Bank among the top 20 countries globally when it comes to ease of doing business. Its progress on economic reform is demonstrated in its strong economic crisis score. North Macedonia significantly progressed on press freedom: from 57th on the 2022 Press Freedom Index to 42nd in 2025. To foster a secure, reliable and resilient digital environment, the government adopted a 2018–2022 National Cyber Security Strategy and Action Plan. Regional cooperation remains challenging. The 2025 Commission report underlined that bilateral agreements with neighbouring countries must be implemented in good faith by all parties, including the Prespa Agreement with Greece and Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation with Bulgaria.

EU involvement

North Macedonia was the first Western Balkan country to sign a stabilisation and association agreement with the EU in 2004; a year later, it became a candidate country. In March 2020, the European Council decided to open accession negotiations, which were officially launched on 19 July 2022. The EU allocated €664 million of funding to North Macedonia through the IPA II instrument for 2014-2020, and €14.162 billion under IPA III for the six Western Balkans countries for 2021-2027. The EU supports the strengthening of transport and energy connectivity, within the Western Balkans and with the EU, through a new connectivity package, road improvements and the implementation of the regional rail strategy, under the Western Balkans Investment Framework. Presented in 2023, the new Reform and Growth Facility will provide up to €6 billion for 2024-2027.

Pakistan

Pakistan ranks 126th on the Normandy Index. Relations with terrorist groups, military interference, strained relations with India, separatism, vulnerability to climate change and a chronically critical financial situation, all contribute to the instability of this fragile democracy.

Background and key issues

Pakistan has undergone phases of military rule and political instability. Pakistan ranks 27th most fragile of 179 states on the 2024 Fragile State Index. Chronic dualism between political and military powers, with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency playing a controversial role, prevents civilian institutions from taking direct control of the state. Pakistan is accused of active terrorism sponsorship and providing a safe haven for terrorist groups. Relations with neighbouring India remain strained and volatile, due in particular to the unresolved Kashmir conflict. Pakistan also faces an escalating Islamist insurgency, run by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. The Global Terrorism Index put Pakistan as the second most impacted country by terrorism in 2025.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

Pakistan ——— South Asia ———

New security and hybrid threats

Threat comparison

■ Pakistan more at risk   ■ South Asia more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a strategic mutual defence agreement (SMDA) on 17 September 2025. The emphasis on strengthening joint deterrence makes it clear that the alliance is defensive in nature. Pakistan faces several separatist threats: the most critical situation is in the south-western province of Baluchistan, where the terrorist threat is also high. The 2025 World Press Freedom Index ranks Pakistan 158th, underlining the severe risks to journalists. Pakistan is one of the world's most disaster-prone countries. High inflation and depreciating currency are at the origin of acute food insecurity and chronic malnutrition rates. A further serious problem is water scarcity. Concerns include the misuse of blasphemy laws, forced religious conversions of minorities and discrimination against minority groups.

EU involvement

The 2019 EU–Pakistan strategic engagement plan (SEP) builds on a 2004 cooperation agreement. An EU–Pakistan joint commission meets annually to review progress on the agreement, with sub-groups for specific areas. In February 2025, the EU and Pakistan held their 9th EU-Pakistan counter-terrorism dialogue. Pakistan is the largest beneficiary of the generalised system of preference plus (GSP+) scheme, giving preferential access to the EU market. The GSP+ was extended to the end of 2027, to provide time for the adoption of the 2024-2034 GSP proposed by the Commission in 2021. However, Pakistan has been under threat of suspension due to concerns over human rights abuses, including religious freedom. In June 2025, the Commission suspended Pakistan's access to GSP+ for ethanol. The EU is Pakistan's second most important trading partner after China; in 2024, it accounted for 12.4 % of Pakistan's trade.

Philippines

The Philippines ranks 94th on the Normandy Index, lower than the Asia–Pacific average, in particular on terrorism and violent conflict. Crime rates are high, and thousands have died in a controversial 'war on drugs'; there is also violence from rebel groups and terrorists.

Background and key issues

The Philippines has a more pluralist political system than most of its neighbours in south–east Asia. However, it ranks in the top quarter of most fragile countries in the world. One reason for its ranking of 64th on the 2024 Fragile States Index is relatively high levels of terrorism, the second highest in the region (ranking 20th on the 2025 Global Terrorism Index). The country has faced Communist, Islamist, separatist and other movement insurgencies since independence. In 2016, IS-affiliated actors sought to establish an 'East-Asia province' in the country, occupying and holding the city of Marawi for five months. The violent crackdown on drug-related crimes, launched in 2016 under then president Rodrigo Duterte, has been widely criticised. Ferdinand Marcos Jr was sworn in as 17th president of the Republic of the Philippines in 2022.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Philippines   — Asia-Pacific

Threat comparison

■ Philippines more at risk   ■ Asia-Pacific more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

The Philippines ranks 116th on the 2025 World Press Freedom Index and 114th on the 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index. In 2024, the World Risk Index ranked the Philippines the country with the highest disaster risk: economic damage from climate change could reach 7.6 % of GDP by 2030 and 13.6 % by 2040. Deforestation has been noted as exacerbating this risk. After initially refusing to cooperate with the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigation into possible crimes against humanity committed in the context of Duterte's 'war on drugs', the Philippines' authorities eventually arrested him in March 2025.

EU involvement

The EU-Philippines partnership and cooperation agreement came into force in 2018; talks on a free trade agreement (FTA) were launched in 2015, but have stalled since 2017. In 2014-2020, the EU allocated €325 million of development aid for two main areas: rule of law and inclusive growth (promoting renewable energy). In 2023, the Philippines' trade minister expressed hope for a FTA before 2028. The Philippines enjoys duty-free access to EU markets for most of its exports under the GSP+ scheme. The EU is the Philippines' fourth largest trade partner. It took part in the EU-ASEAN commemorative summit in Brussels in 2022. In March 2024, the EU and the Philippines officially announced the resumption of negotiations for an ambitious, modern and balanced FTA, with sustainability at its core. In 2024, the EU-ASEAN Business Council meeting was held in Manila.

Russia

Russia's 124th ranking on the Normandy Index, marking a substantial deterioration since 2024, reflects elevation of risks related to WMD, violent conflict, terrorism and crime. Security threats are likely to increase, due to the consequences of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Background and key issues

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia rebuilt many of its institutions, becoming an 'electoral autocracy'. The regime has become increasingly authoritarian following Vladimir Putin's election in 2000 and especially after Russia's full invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Russia retained the Soviet Union's UN Security Council Permanent Seat and inherited the entire stock of nuclear weapons. According to SIPRI, as of January 2024 the Russian Federation maintained a military stockpile of approximately 4 380 nuclear warheads. About 2 822 were strategic warheads, of which roughly 1 710 have been deployed. Russia has a high energy security level, owing to its vast oil and gas reserves, which it has long used as a foreign policy tool.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Russia   — Russia and Eurasia

Threat comparison

■ Russia more at risk   ■ Russia and Eurasia more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

Russia's full-scale, unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 met with widespread global condemnation. Russia's indicators on violent conflict, WMD, terrorism and crime have deteriorated since. Ukraine's retaliatory drone attacks on strategic Russian facilities, especially refineries, aim to curtail its production capacity. Russia is considered a main source of global disinformation campaigns, targeting domestic and foreign audiences. Together with restrictions on independent media and civil society, this has severely impacted public opinion. Russia is thought to have advanced cyber-attack capabilities. Putin's most critical opponent and Sakharov Prize laureate, Alexei Navalny, died in a Siberian prison in 2024, a death considered instigated by Putin.

EU involvement

Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the EU imposed sanctions, expanding those introduced after its 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea, to include economic sanctions affecting 55 % of pre-war trade and media and individual restrictions. The EU has also sanctioned Russian entities and individuals under global regimes for human rights violations, its use of chemical weapons and cyber-attacks. In 2024 the EU adopted two new sanctions regimes targeting Russia to address human rights violations and internal repression and respond to Russia's destabilising activities (hybrid attacks) worldwide. A legislative proposal for a complete phasing-out of natural gas and oil imports from Russia by 2027-2028 is under negotiation. Commission President von der Leyen considers financing the 'pressing financial needs' of Ukraine's war and reconstruction efforts through frozen Russian assets the most acceptable option.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia moved up to 24th on the Normandy Index in 2025. The country's primary challenge is implementing its ambitious Vision 2030 economic diversification programme amid severe regional turmoil. The ongoing Israel-Hamas war and the fallout from military exchanges between Israel and Iran are testing Riyadh's foreign policy of de-escalating conflict to protect its economic transformation. The 2023 Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, once a stabilising factor, now appears fragile in this far more volatile landscape.

Background and key issues

Saudi Arabia has been engaged in a decades-long proxy war with Iran since the 1979 Iranian revolution. A reconciliation driven by Saudi Arabia's crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, and Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was announced in China in March 2023. The June 2025 military exchanges between Israel and Iran, which involved US attacks, have significantly increased the risk of broader regional conflict that could endanger Saudi economic and energy assets. Furthermore, the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad in Syria in late 2024 has created a new arena for rival powers, including Iran, to interfere near Saudi borders.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Saudi Arabia   — MENA

New security and hybrid threats

Threat comparison

■ Saudi Arabia more at risk   ■ MENA more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

Crown Prince since 2017, Mohammed bin Salman has instituted economic and social reforms, including the wide-ranging Vision 2030 plan. The Kingdom has a poor human rights record. It permits no independent media and scored 19th lowest on the 2025 World Press Freedom Index. The prospect of normalising relations with Israel has dimmed even more after an Israeli strike on Hamas leaders in Qatar in September 2025. This event, coupled with a muted US response, has fuelled a sense that American security guarantees are unreliable. This has prompted Riyadh to further diversify its security partnerships, including signing a mutual defence agreement with Pakistan. Meanwhile, attacks by Iran-backed Houthi rebels on vessels in the Red Sea threaten maritime security.

EU involvement

The EU's relationship with Saudi Arabia is framed by cooperation with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which comprises Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the UAE, under a 1988 agreement and a 2022 strategic partnership plan. The EU and Saudi Arabia signed a cooperation arrangement in 2021. Diplomatic engagement intensified at the first EU–GCC Summit in Brussels in October 2024, with a joint statement on further cooperation. The EU, the European Parliament in particular, have criticised Saudi Arabia's human rights record and condemned its role in Yemen.

Serbia

Serbia ranks 41st on the Normandy Index, scoring below the European regional average, in particular on violent conflict, democratic processes and resilience to disinformation. While it scores well on terrorism and economic crisis indicators, Serbia faces urgent challenges, such as the normalisation process with Kosovo and decoupling from Russian energy.

Background and key issues

Regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations, for resolving bilateral problems, including the Belgrade-Pristina dispute are preconditions for Serbia's EU accession. However, a comprehensive normalisation of relations with Kosovo remains elusive, despite some developments, such as the engagement in Ohrid, North Macedonia, in 2023 to implement the EU-mediated deal. Serbia held snap parliamentary elections in 2023 with the victory of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and alleged electoral irregularities that sparked a protest movement led by a coalition of opposition parties. New protests erupted in November 2024, following the collapse of Novi Sad railway station under renovation by Chinese contractors.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Serbia — Europe

New security and hybrid threats

Threat comparison

■ Serbia more at risk   ■ Europe more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

Strategic competition and disinformation campaigns between global powers are on the rise in Serbia. Russia is a traditional geopolitical ally and has provided diplomatic support, backing Serbia's position on non-recognition of Kosovo. Serbia is also involved in the tensions in northern Kosovo, where the EU has called for 'immediate de-escalation, early elections with the participation of Kosovo Serbs, and a return to dialogue on normalisation'. Serbia is resisting aligning with the EU on Russian sanctions over Ukraine. Serbia is also a founding member of the 16+1 initiative, led by China. Russia remains Serbia's biggest arms supplier, although in increasing competition with China. On 9 October 2025, US sanctions on Serbian oil company NIS, owned by Russian entities, came into force, arguing for gradual decoupling from Russia.

EU involvement

Serbia applied for EU membership on 22 December 2009 and accession negotiations began in 2014. The government has continued to declare EU membership its strategic goal and set a new, more ambitious target date of the end of 2026 to meet the technical criteria for membership. Serbia and Kosovo have been engaged in an EU-mediated dialogue since 2011, following the adoption of the 2010 UN General Assembly Resolution 64/298. Serbia (and Kosovo) still needs to implement the March 2023 Ohrid agreement as part of the accession negotiation requirements, under Chapter 35 ('Other issues').

Somalia

Somalia ranks 136th on the Normandy Index and is more at risk of threats to peace than the African Union average. A weak central government struggles to control the Federal Republic's territory, facing tensions with some of its regions, inter-clan violence and frequent and massive armed group attacks on civilians.

Background and key issues

Somalia's decentralised federal model is characterised by weak central institutions, with little practical control over much of the territory (notably in Puntland and Somaliland), and a wide array of rural areas and critical connections controlled by the violent extremist group Al-Shabaab. In January 2025, the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission (AUSSOM) replaced the Transition Mission and is expected to strengthen Somalia's governance and security forces. In addition, Somalia is highly vulnerable to climate shocks, such as floods and droughts. As a result of the country's fragile situation and the complex set of crises it faces, nearly 6 million Somalians need urgent humanitarian assistance, with around 5 million acutely food insecure.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

Somalia — sub-Saharan Africa

Threat comparison

■ Somalia more at risk   ■ sub-Saharan Africa more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

The Ethiopia-Somaliland deal giving sea access to Ethiopia in exchange for potentially recognising Somaliland's independence caused tensions between the federal government and both Somaliland and Ethiopia. Al-Shabaab remains the most significant threat to peace and security, exploiting domestic and regional grievances to recruit fighters from Somali clans, as well as Ethiopians, Kenyans and Tanzanians. Counter-terrorism depends on external military assistance from AUSSOM, countries such as Kenya, Egypt, Türkiye and the US, and a variety of private military companies. Weak border controls facilitate arms smuggling. Violations of international humanitarian law and human rights are widespread.

EU involvement

The EU strategy for the Horn of Africa aligns several external policy programmes and instruments to tackle insecurity and its root causes in the Red Sea, Somalia and neighbouring countries. Three EU CSDP missions are based in Somalia: a naval force (EUNAVFOR Atalanta), a mission to build up and train Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia) and a civilian mission to improve maritime security and wider police capacity. Atalanta protects World Food Programme and other vessels from piracy and armed robbery in Somali territorial waters. It coordinates with EUNAVFOR Aspides to protect vessels from Yemeni Houthi militia attacks in the Red Sea. The EU's humanitarian aid to Somalia amounted to €82.16 million in 2024 and €36 million in 2025.

South Africa

South Africa ranks 80th on the Normandy Index, scoring higher than the sub-Saharan African average, in particular on cybersecurity, democratic processes and vulnerability to terrorism. While it is considered low-risk, and despite the end of apartheid in 1994, South Africa still struggles with extremes of inequality and high crime rates.

Background and key issues

South Africa has one of the consistently highest income inequality scores in the world; approximately 25 % of the country's population live below the poverty line. Despite South Africa's strong democratic processes and status as the second largest African economy, it ranks 80th on the 2025 Fragile States Index. South Africa's high violent crime rates contribute to this fragility. The homicide rate is rising, making the country one of the most vulnerable in the world. General elections in May 2024 confirmed the predicted fall in support for the African National Congress (ANC), which lost its parliamentary majority. Forging an alliance with four other parties to form a government, Parliament re-elected ANC leader Cyril Ramaphosa as president in June 2024. In 1991, South Africa became the first country to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

## New security and hybrid threats

Threat comparison

Owing in part to its pluralist political foundations, South Africa exhibits strong resilience to disinformation. It ranks 27th on the 2025 World Press Freedom Index and has a relatively high score on the cybersecurity indicator for the region. Climate change poses particular risks for South Africa. In 2021, it committed to carbon emission neutrality by 2050. In May 2024, it considered lodging a complaint at the World Trade Organization against the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism. The genocide case (*South Africa* v *Israel*) brought by Pretoria before the ICJ in December 2023, its support for the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court for Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the former Israeli defence minister, and its close ties with Iran have alienated South Africa from the second Trump administration.

EU involvement

The EU considers South Africa one of its 10 strategic partners in the world. Their strong relationship is based on the 2000 bilateral trade, development and cooperation agreement and the EU–SADC economic partnership agreement (provisional since 2016). In 2021, the EU and South Africa agreed new common objectives for development cooperation over the next seven years: sustainable, resilient, transformative and inclusive growth; reducing inequalities; and partnerships (including promoting the rule of law, and partnerships and alliances to eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls). The EU is the country's largest trading partner.

South Korea

South Korea ranks 12th on the Normandy Index, making it the third best-performing country in Asia after Singapore and Malaysia. The country performs well on cybersecurity, democratic processes, climate change, crime and the economy. However, due to high crude oil and natural gas imports, it is vulnerable on energy insecurity.

Background and key issues

When the Korean War ended in 1953, the Republic of Korea counted among the poorest countries in the world. According to the World Bank, its 2023 GDP per capita reached US$33 121. The country ranks 20th on the UNDP Human Development Index and 33rd on the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index. South Korea has not announced any major new targets since its first nationally determined contribution at COP26 and submitted to the UNFCCC in 2021, setting a target to reduce emissions by 40 % below 2018 levels by 2030. South Korea has a standing army of 613 000 and spends US$48 billion or 2.8 % of GDP on defence.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— South Korea — Asia-Pacific

Threat comparison

■ South Korea more at risk   ■ Asia-Pacific more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

The high ranking on the UN Agency for digital technology's 2024 ICT Development Index is explained by South Korea's top score for connectivity, high broadband penetration and technical and legal measures. The country ranks 61st on the World Press Freedom Index. On 29 September 2021, the Democratic Party, which still holds a clear majority inside the Korean National Assembly, decided not to pursue amendments to the press law which would undermine media freedom. South Korea is vulnerable in the energy sector, as it imports almost 93.5 % of its energy and natural resource consumption. In 2022, Korea spent US$190.8 billion on importing energy and resources, nearly 26.1 % of its total imports.

EU involvement

The EU has had trade and diplomatic relations with South Korea since 1963. Since 2010, it has also been one of the EU's strategic partners in Asia. The EU-South Korea free trade agreement entered into force in 2015. South Korea is the EU's eighth largest export destination for goods, and the EU is South Korea's third largest export market. In 2023, the EU was the largest foreign investor in South Korea (€53.3 billion). Both have a strong joint interest in a nuclear-free Korean peninsula and cooperate towards lasting peace and stability. An agreement establishing a framework for South Korea's participation in EU crisis management operations was signed in 2014. On 10 March 2025, the EU and Korea concluded negotiations on an EU-Korea digital trade agreement.

Sudan

Sudan ranks 122nd on the Normandy Index. The armed conflict between the two military factions in power has disrupted the path to democracy. It has triggered the displacement of over 15 million people, driven 25 million into high levels of food insecurity and caused the outbreak of serious diseases such as cholera. The situation in Sudan is a serious threat to regional stability.

Background and key issues

In Sudan the transition efforts stalled because of strong disagreements within the Sovereign Council, headed by General Al-Burhan, a former Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) commander, and General 'Hemedti' Dagolo, chief of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group in control of the mining sector (mainly gold in Darfur). The dispute, notably the integration of the RSF into the SAF, led to fighting in the capital in April 2023, quickly spreading across the country. It has resulted in massive human rights abuses, including sexual violence, recruitment of child soldiers and the weaponisation of hunger. More than half the population of Sudan requires humanitarian assistance within the country and in neighbouring countries.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)
— Sudan — MENA

New security and hybrid threats

Threat comparison

■ Sudan more at risk   ■ MENA more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

While humanitarian needs are escalating rapidly, violations of international humanitarian law hinder humanitarian access. This further weakens the region's security situation. The country is de facto run by two parallel governments, along shifting frontlines. Both the SAF and RSF have strengthened alliances with regional countries and global players. These alignments are influenced by broader geopolitical considerations, such as control of Red Sea strategic waterways and access to gold and mineral resources. As a result of this foreign support, the country is awash with smuggled weapons, some originating from European factories, despite the UN embargo in Darfur. Mediation attempts have been undermined by SAF and RSF ideological differences and wanting to consolidate their military positions before negotiating. The spillover of geopolitical rivalries, including at the UN Security Council, has also resulted in competing 'roadmaps' for peace. Experts highlight that the success of any roadmap will depend on coordinated and sustained international pressure.

EU involvement

EU humanitarian assistance to Sudan and its impacted neighbouring countries came to €260 million in 2024 and €269 million in 2025 (as of 19 June). The EU and its Member States pledged €522 million in aid for 2025. The EU has imposed sanctions on parties involved in the conflict in Sudan and is actively involved in coordinating peace initiatives.

Syria

Ranking 134th on the Normandy Index, Syria is the least peaceful country in the world. It is a fragile state for which indicators on democratic processes, terrorism, resilience to disinformation and violent conflict are particularly low.

Background and key issues

On 8 December 2024, the overthrow of the Assad regime by a rebel coalition led by the jihadi group Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) ended nearly 14 years of civil war, which claimed over half a million lives. Syria is facing major economic, humanitarian and security challenges. 14 million people have been displaced internally and externally, and 16.5 million people in Syria need humanitarian assistance. In March 2025, Syria's new president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, signed a constitutional declaration for a five-year transitional period and appointed an interim government. On 5 October 2025, first elections were held (except in Kurdish and Druze areas) for a partially and indirectly elected legislative assembly, with a third of all seats appointed by the president.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Syria — MENA

Threat comparison

■ Syria more at risk   ■ MENA more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

The reconstruction of the country remains a major challenge, with estimates of costs ranging from US$250 billion to US$923 billion. To facilitate this process, the EU and the US lifted their sanctions on Syria, effective on 29 May and 1 July 2025 respectively. Syria remains fragmented, with continued clashes between government and Syrian Kurdish forces in the north-east. Violence also erupted in the Alawite-majority coastal region and in the Druze-majority region of Suwayda. In addition, Israel has occupied the buffer zone separating the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights from Syria and targeted Syrian military sites with air strikes; Israel-Syria talks on a security agreement are ongoing. Syria ranks 3rd on the 2025 Global Terrorism Index, with 369 IS terrorist attacks in 2024.

EU involvement

The EU suspended cooperation with the Syrian government under the European Neighbourhood policy in 2011 in response to the repression of anti-government protests, and adopted sanctions against the Assad regime. The EU and its Member States are the largest donors to Syria, with over €37 billion since 2011 for humanitarian, development, economic and stabilisation assistance in Syria and for Syrians in the region. In 2025, EU humanitarian funding for Syria amounted to €202.5 million. The ninth edition of the Brussels Conference on Syria took place in March 2025, with the EU and partners committing an overall €5.8 billion in support to Syria.

Thailand

Thailand ranks 64th on the Normandy Index. Rapid economic growth has lifted the country from the low-income to upper-middle bracket in just a few decades, but its development has been marred by political instability, terrorism and recurrent military coups.

Background and key issues

A long-running insurgency in Muslim-majority southern Thailand has claimed over 7 000 lives since 2004, affecting the country's security. Peace talks between the government and main rebel group, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), have yielded little progress. In 2024 the Constitutional Court dissolved the opposition Move Forward Party over a proposed reform of the *lèse-majesté* laws and removed PM Srettha Thavisin. Paetongtarn Shinawatra became the new PM, until summer 2025 when she was removed from office for ethical misconduct over her handling of the conflict with Cambodia.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

Thailand — Asia-Pacific

New security and hybrid threats

Threat comparison

■ Thailand more at risk   ■ Asia-Pacific more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

Recent years have seen frequent clashes between reformers and pro-monarchy conservatives in Thailand. After five years of military rule, elections in 2019 installed a nominally civilian government, continuing the rule of the former junta. Elections in 2023 were 'peaceful and orderly', explaining the improved score on democratic progress, but the space for democratic deliberation has been significantly reduced, not least through the *lèse-majesté* law. These restrictions on freedom of expression mean Thailand ranks 85th on the 2024 Press Freedom Index. The 2024 Fragile States Index ranks Thailand 95th, with political instability and the role of the military identified as particular areas of weakness. Thailand ranks as the 28th worst country on the 2024 Global Terrorism Index, a slight improvement on the previous year.

EU involvement

After the 2014 military coup, the EU broke off talks with Thailand on a partnership and cooperation agreement (PCA) and a free trade agreement. The relative restoration of civilian rule in 2019 opened the door to renewed engagement and, following the European Council conclusions of 2019, the EU began to broaden its engagement with Thailand. Negotiations on the PCA resumed in July 2021 and were concluded in September 2022. The PCA was signed in December 2022. EU bilateral aid includes projects supporting Thai exporters, refugees from Myanmar, and workers in the fisheries sector. On 23 March 2023, both sides announced relaunching of trade negotiations. As a member of ASEAN, Thailand cooperates with the EU in multilateral forums. The EU renewed its commitment to human rights and democracy in the country on 27 May 2024, extending its 2020-2024 action plan on human rights and democracy until 2027.

Tunisia

Tunisia ranks 72nd on the Normandy Index. Tunisia performs well on energy insecurity, climate change, cybersecurity and violent conflicts. However, Tunisia's performance on democratic processes, crime and resilience to disinformation remains poor.

Background and key issues

Since the removal of former president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali during the 2011 Jasmine Revolution, Tunisia has undergone democratic reforms. The revolution pushed the country up the Fragile States Index from 118th in 2010 to 92nd in 2025. Tunisia is also affected by regional instability and conflict, particularly in neighbouring Libya. President Kaïs Saïed dissolved the assembly in July 2021. A constitutional referendum took place, a year to the day when Saïed seized broad powers in a move opponents have called a coup. Tunisia held run-off elections in January 2023 (the first round was held in December). In December 2023, Tunisian voters elected 2 155 members of 279 local councils for a 5-year term. President Saïed secured his second term in the October 2024 presidential elections, marked by low turnout at just 28.8 %.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

Threat comparison

New security and hybrid threats

Tunisia ranks 129th of 180 countries on the 2025 Press Freedom Index. The country scores well on energy security, as it sources around 85 % of its needs from domestic oil and gas. The heterogeneous regional development and equality gap between the north and south of the country is a permanent source of internal instability. Disillusioned youth and an economically fragile population in the south leads to anti-government rebellion and terrorist action. In 2015, Tunisia suffered two major terrorist attacks in tourist hotspots, leading to a drastic decline in the tourist economy. A nationwide state of emergency, first imposed after a suicide attack on a police bus on 24 November 2015, was extended until the end of 2025. In 2020, three people died in a suicide bombing near the US embassy. Tunisia ranked 43rd on the 2025 Global Terrorism Index.

EU involvement

The EU-Tunisia association agreement was signed in 1995. The 2011 revolution led to a privileged partnership in 2012. Between 2011 and 2017, EU assistance to Tunisia came to €2.4 billion. The EU and Tunisia are currently negotiating a free trade agreement. From 2017 to 2020, the EU's bilateral assistance averaged €300 million per year. Tunisia is also eligible for funding under the IcSP and Erasmus+. On 16 July 2023, a memorandum of understanding was signed, under which, among other things, the EU agreed to give Tunisia financial and technical support to deter Europe-bound irregular migration. Parliament, Council of Europe and NGOs noted that the MoU and externalised asylum and migration policies have not provided sufficient human rights preconditions.

Türkiye

Türkiye ranks 96th on the Normandy Index, notably due to violent conflicts, terrorism, weak democratic processes and climate change. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan won the presidential elections in May 2023. However, the ruling conservative AKP was less successful in 2024 local elections. A Turkish court issued a fresh arrest order for Istanbul's jailed mayor in October 2025 on suspicion of political espionage marking a new crackdown on the opposition.

Background and key issues

A failed military coup in 2016 was followed by constitutional reform and a strengthened presidential regime, repression of political opposition and participation in foreign conflicts and maritime disputes in the eastern Mediterranean with EU Member States. Türkiye ranks 62nd on the Fragile States Index and 29th in the 2023 Global Terrorism Index. This reflects attacks by ISIL/Da'esh and the Kurdistan Workers' Party. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan from the Justice and Development Party (AKP) was re-elected in 2023 with 52.18 % of the vote. However, 2024 local elections reasserted the opposition Republican People's Party as a political force, retaining Ankara and gaining 15 other mayoral seats, and Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoğlu as the opposition leader.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

Threat comparison

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

Imamoğlu and dozens of officials from the Istanbul municipality were arrested in March 2025 over corruption allegations. The mayor has since been held in prison. He is considered the main challenger to Erdoğan's 22-year rule. His arrest led to the largest street protests in over a decade. Türkiye ranks 159th (out of 180) in the 2025 Press Freedom Index. The country also suffers from high energy insecurity, as 74 % of energy is imported. Annual inflation in October 2025 was 32.8 %, a significant decrease from its peak (75.45 % in May 2024). The central bank has raised its year-end inflation forecast for 2025 to 31 %–33 % and expects it to be 13 %–19 % by the end of 2026.

EU involvement

Türkiye has been in a customs union with the EU since 1995 and an accession country since 2005. Relations with the EU have deteriorated in recent years. In 2017, the co-legislators agreed to cut pre-accession funds owing to failing democratic standards, and suspended accession talks. Following the February 2023 earthquake, the International Donors' Conference pledged a total €7 billion, of which €6.05 billion was grants and loans for Türkiye. Türkiye's 'non-binary policy' in Russia's war on Ukraine reflects a very low alignment rate of 4 % with the EU High Representative's statements and Council decisions on sanctions as of 24 October 2025, compared with 6 % in 2024.

Ukraine

Ukraine ranks 108th on the Normandy Index. Since February 2022, Russia's illegal and unjustified war of aggression has deeply disrupted human, economic and political activity. The EU remains committed to providing further political, military and financial support to help Ukraine exercise its right of self-defence.

Background and key issues

In 2013, President Viktor Yanukovych's decision not to sign an association agreement with the EU sparked major pro-European protests. In February 2014, the Ukrainian parliament voted to remove Yanukovych from power, citing abandoning office as grounds. Russia responded by annexing the Crimean Peninsula in March 2014, launching a hybrid war, including initially limited military aggression in eastern Ukraine and repetitive military build-up at the country's borders. Russia launched a full-scale war on Ukraine on 24 February 2022, in violation of international law. Over 5.7 million refugees have left the country.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Ukraine — Europe

New security and hybrid threats

Threat comparison

■ Ukraine more at risk ■ Europe more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

Ukraine has lost control of around 19 % of its territory since 2022, including the Crimean Peninsula, regions around the Azov Sea, most of the Luhansk region, large parts of the Donbas region and part of the Black Sea coast. Ukraine regained control of north-eastern and southern parts of the country and disabled a third of the Russian Black Sea fleet. Its drone strikes against Russian refineries disabled up to 38 % of oil-refining capacity. The new Trump administration initially called into question previous US policy. Joint assessment estimated the war damage inflicted by end-2024 at €170 billion, and economic losses at €568 billion. Military expenditure reached US$64.7 billion, representing 34 % of GDP. As noted by the Commission 2025 report on Ukraine, '[the anti-corruption bodies] NABU and SAPO maintained pressure by exposing major cases of corruption, including at highest levels of government'.

EU involvement

EU-Ukraine relations are based on a 2014 association agreement, including a DCFTA. EU, its Member States and financial institutions have allocated €177.5 billion, including €63.2 billion of military assistance, of which €6.1 billion mobilised under the European Peace Facility. To support Ukraine's army, the EU established a military assistance mission (EUMAM Ukraine). Established for two years, EUMAM has trained 80 000 Ukrainian soldiers. The Ukraine Facility worth €50 billion provides financial support for 2024-2027. To reduce energy insecurity, Ukraine's power grid was synchronised with the Continental European power grid in 2022. EU leaders granted Ukraine EU accession candidate status in 2022. Accession negotiations began on 25 June 2024. The screening process finished in October 2025 and opening of negotiations is pending.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom (UK) ranks 14th on the Normandy Index, indicating rather low levels of risk. It performs slightly better than the regional average on a majority of indicators, but scores markedly worse on WMD and terrorism threats. It scores particularly well globally on cybersecurity.

Background and key issues

The UK has a well-established democratic tradition in the form of a parliamentary system. While it has a strong education system and high per capita GDP, it also has one of the highest levels of income inequality in Europe. The 2024 Human Development Index ranked the UK 15th of the 193 countries measured. The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index places the UK 17th overall, with the country performing exceptionally well on electoral process and pluralism. While ranked 30th on the 2025 Global Peace Index, it is a significant global arms and defence exporter and possesses an arsenal of nuclear weapons. Consequently, it has the 110th lowest score for WMD on the Normandy Index. The UK scores above the regional average on risks connected to terrorism.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

—— United Kingdom   —— Europe

Threat comparison

■ United Kingdom more at risk   ■ Europe more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

The cost of living has risen sharply in the UK in the last four years, with high inflation and soaring food, energy and housing costs. A deteriorating domestic human rights record and related protections were coupled with violence towards immigrants and minorities in July and August, fuelled by online misinformation. In the hardening security environment in Europe, the UK upped its defence spending and increased its nuclear stockpile cap from 225 to 260 warheads. While the country has a high level of press freedom, ranking 20th on the 2025 Press Freedom Index, it is not immune to misinformation and has been subject to Russian interference in its political processes.

EU involvement

As the UK is not an EU Member State as of 31 January 2020, mutual relations are now governed by the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA). The EU and the UK under its Labour government launched a security and defence partnership based on biannual structured foreign policy dialogue and consultation mechanisms to facilitate the exchange of information and cooperation. This is complemented by negotiations in other areas, such as trade, energy and youth mobility. Furthermore, there is EU-UK cooperation through NATO, in the areas defined by the three NATO-EU joint declarations. Both sides have cooperated successfully, including through the G7, in the context of Russia's war on Ukraine, providing aid, weapons and coordinating sanctions. The UK has joined the military mobility project within the EU's permanent structured cooperation (PESCO). Economic ties are also strong, with the EU being the UK's largest trading partner.

United States of America

The US ranks 74th on the Normandy Index, up from 90th the previous year. It faces threats in the WMD domain, high levels of political polarisation, gun violence and domestic terrorism.

Background and key issues

The United States is a clear [global leader](#) in terms of GDP, innovation and economic growth. The highest share of [world military expenditure](#) (37 %, SIPRI 2024), continued engagement in external conflict, high levels of weapon imports and exports and incarceration rates, and partisan disagreement about the functioning of democratic institutions all contribute to a low level of peace relative to other high-income countries. The US has the [highest rate](#) of gun violence of this group of countries, with gun suicides accounting for [58 %](#) in 2023. However, in 2024 firearm deaths, excluding suicides, [decreased](#) for the third consecutive year. While the US lowered its risk of economic crisis following solid economic growth of [2.5 %](#) in 2024, its federal debt [continued](#) to rise to [118.7 % of GDP](#) in 2025.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— United States — North America

Threat comparison

■ United States more at risk   ■ North America more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

New security and hybrid threats

The 2019 US withdrawal from the [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty](#) with Russia and its 2020 withdrawal from the 1992 [Open Skies Treaty](#) were alarming developments. Although the US extended the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia, the latter [suspended](#) the treaty in 2023, and the parties no longer share data on nuclear weapons. In 2023, the US issued a [strategy for countering WMD](#) that recognises China as a 'pacing challenge' and Russia as an 'acute threat'. The US has suffered from an [increase](#) in [domestic terrorism](#) and [high exposure](#) to [disinformation](#).

EU involvement

The US is an important and strategic EU [partner](#) in the promotion of global peace and security. In 2011, the US signed a [framework partnership agreement](#) on participation in CSDP operations and on 26 April 2023, the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the US Department of Defense [signed](#) an [administrative agreement](#) providing for stronger transatlantic cooperation in specific areas of defence. US-EU cooperation also takes place through NATO, in the areas defined by the [NATO-EU](#) joint declaration. On counter-terrorism, bilateral agreements include an [operational agreement](#) between the US and Europol, the EU-US terrorist finance tracking programme [agreement](#), and the EU-US passenger name record agreement. In July 2023, the European Commission issued an [adequacy decision](#) under a new EU-US Data Privacy Framework, [agreed](#) in March 2022 and enabled by [executive order 14086](#) signed in October 2022. In August 2025, a [joint statement](#) on a US-EU framework on an agreement on reciprocal, fair and balanced trade was signed which is being implemented, including through [legislative](#) [action](#) by the EU and [executive action](#) by the US.

Venezuela

Venezuela ranks 114th on the Normandy Index and is considered more at risk than the South American average. It performs worse on every indicator except energy insecurity at regional level, with international sanctions exacerbating the situation in this domain.

Background and key issues

In the July 2024 presidential elections, a significant majority of Venezuelans voted for democratic change by supporting Edmundo González Urrutia. Venezuelan authorities had banned opposition candidate from the Unitary Platform, María Corina Machado (2025 Nobel Peace Prize winner) from office for 15 years, due to her support for former opposition leader Juan Guaidó. After Venezuela's attorney general issued an arrest warrant for González, he fled into exile in September 2024. He remains in hiding in Venezuela. On 10 January 2025, Nicolás Maduro illegitimately took power in a fraudulent act, without any democratic legitimacy or verifiable evidence of electoral integrity. The NGO Freedom House has categorised Venezuela as 'not free'.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

Venezuela — South America

New security and hybrid threats

Threat comparison

■ Venezuela more at risk ■ South America more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

On the 2024 Fragile States Index, Venezuela marks poorly as a result of falling state legitimacy. It has one of the world's highest crime rates due to government corruption, a flawed judiciary system and the breakdown of the rule of law. It also has the highest homicide rates globally. According to the UNHCR, nearly 8 million Venezuelans are refugees or displaced. On 10 January 2025, in a multilateral sanctions action, the US, Canada, EU and UK sanctioned various Venezuelan individuals linked to the Venezuelan government and prominent state-owned entities. The Maduro regime has also used digital disinformation as a political strategy and continues to crack down on journalists and freedom of expression. In 2025, the US military struck at least three boats from Venezuela allegedly carrying narco-traffickers and drugs; and also seized oil tanker carrying Venezuelan oil.

EU involvement

The EU supported the failed dialogue efforts between the government and the parliamentary majority, and reiterated the need for transparent elections in 2018, and again in 2020. It also imposed targeted sanctions and an arms embargo. Venezuela has benefited from 10 IcSP projects totalling more than €21 million. In 2020, the EU promoted an International Donors' Conference to help Venezuelan refugees and migrants, pledging €147 million. It established an International Contact Group on Venezuela, which works to facilitate conditions for a peaceful and democratic solution to the Venezuelan crisis and the rapid delivery of humanitarian aid. In March 2023, the Commission released over €75 million in humanitarian aid. On 10 January 2025, the EU stressed that Nicolás Maduro lacks the legitimacy of a democratically elected president.

Yemen

Yemen ranks 132nd on the Normandy Index, making it the fourth least peaceful country in the world. The conflict between the Saudi-backed government and Iran-backed Houthi forces that erupted in 2014 has killed hundreds of thousands, displaced millions and created severe food shortages. A truce negotiated in April 2022 continues to deliver beyond expectations.

Background and key issues

Yemen has suffered decades of internal conflict, economic mismanagement and extreme weather conditions. A popular uprising in 2011 led authoritarian President Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down. Taking advantage of the ensuing period of political instability, the Houthi movement, tied to the Shia Muslim minority and supported by Iran, took control of northern parts in 2014, sparking a civil war with the Saudi-backed Yemeni government. An estimated 151 000 people have since been killed and 4.5 million displaced as a direct result of the conflict. Over 226 200 people are believed to have died from indirect consequences of the war, including food shortages and lack of health services. Yemen is 22nd on the 2025 Global Terrorism Index.

Peace profile 2025
(10 = Strength, 0 = Weakness)

— Yemen — MENA

New security and hybrid threats

Threat comparison

■ Yemen more at risk ■ MENA more at risk

Line represents equal level of risk

In 2025, Yemen ranked sixth on the Fragile States Index, mainly due to the lack of central government control in large areas dominated by Houthi forces. The war between Israel and Hamas increased tensions with Iranian-aligned Houthi rebels, who have renewed strikes against Israeli and international vessels in the Red Sea. Nevertheless, the UN-mediated six-month ceasefire, which began in 2022, seems to still hold. Mediation by Saudi Arabia, Oman, the US, UN and the Gulf Cooperation Council, have prevented further escalation, but the risk remains high. In 2025, 19.5 million people are estimated to need humanitarian assistance, and 17.6 million face food and nutrition insecurity, 1.3 million more than the previous year. The country has a 97 % cereal import dependency ratio and imports a third of its wheat from Ukraine. Yemen ranks 15th worst on the 2023 Notre Dame Adaptability Index, a reflection of high vulnerability to climate change.

EU involvement

Since the beginning of the war in 2015, the EU has contributed almost €1.5 billion to respond to the crisis in Yemen. This includes €1 billion in humanitarian aid (with €125 million allocated in 2024 alone) and €487 million in development assistance. EU humanitarian aid includes food assistance, healthcare, education, water and shelter. It also includes improved hygiene services in areas of high food insecurity and malnutrition, conflict-affected areas and for displaced populations.

ANNEX – The Normandy Index: Methodology

5. The Normandy Index methodology

5.1. Background

Humanity is facing unparalleled challenges in its history. The 2020 pandemic caused an acute, worldwide crisis and crystallised the interconnectivity of a globalised world. This is taking place against the backdrop of 'megatrends' caused by climate change, ever-decreasing biodiversity, depletion of the earth's fresh water and overpopulation. All of these are occurring in a socio-political time of great uncertainty, with shifting power dynamics amongst global superpowers, the breakdown of traditional alliances and a widespread crisis of democracy.

Such challenges, whether short or long term, call for global solutions and require cooperation on a scale unprecedented in human history. In a hyper-connected world, the sources of many of these challenges are multidimensional, increasingly complex and span national borders.

These challenges, if not addressed, will increase the strain on resources, infrastructure and society, which can affect levels of peace in nations and the world. The United Nations and World Bank *Pathways for Peace* report released in 2018 recognised the interconnectivity of these challenges and called for risks to be considered multidimensional in nature (World Bank and United Nations, 2018).

To contribute to the field, the European Parliament, in partnership with the Region of Normandy, produces the Normandy Index (NI) on an annual basis, starting with its launch in 2019. The purpose of the NI is to produce a measurement tool to enable policy-makers and civil society to understand different aspects of the threats facing us. It aims to capture threats to peace and offer insights into the multidimensional risks borne by countries. Annual updates allow the tool to track how dynamics shift from year to year and assess the positive and negative changes in risks.

The NI has three main aims:

1   To assess the state of conflict and potential for conflict in each country in view of the current and potential future state;
2   To provide a tool for measuring and monitoring trends across time;
3   To provide a mechanism to link the aforementioned threat categories with a ranking of 'state and risk of conflict' that can be quantified and used for policy-making purposes.

Text box 1: The Normandy Index in context

The NI is intended to contribute to the field by identifying different factors that the European Parliament believes pose threats to peace in the coming years. The NI captures and conveys a unique angle to existing composite indices, such as the Institute for Economics and Peace's (IEP) Global Peace Index (GPI).

The GPI produced annually by the IEP ranks 163 independent states and territories according to their level of peace as defined by the absence of violence and absence of fear of violence (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019a). It is therefore a measure of levels of *negative* peace today. The IEP also explores the *positive* aspects of peace in its Positive Peace Index (PPI), which measures the 163 countries' levels of attitudes, institutions and structures that are known to create and sustain peaceful societies.

Both the GPI and PPI measure levels of peace in the world *today*. The NI, on the other hand, captures *threats* to peace in the world today, making it a useful contribution to the suite of tools used for quantitative analysis of peace and security.

The NI covers 137 countries and EU-27. The EU is considered one bloc and is given the average score of its Member States.

Normandy Index, 2025

Level of threat to peace

more at risk   moderate risk   less at risk

In the EU Global Strategy 2016, the EU has prioritised a number of domains as threats to peace in the coming years.

Each domain is in and of itself a complex system with multiple, interconnecting dimensions that are hard to quantify. Recognising this, the NI seeks to simplify many of these domain concepts by selecting one key representative indicator (rather than delving into the more complex and subjective exercise of selecting, weighting and aggregating multiple indicators for each domain). The indicators were selected for each domain in consultation with the European Parliament based on current academic and policy literature and data availability.

Table 1 shows the indicators selected to capture these domains.

Table 1 – Indicators

IEP research is directly relevant to the NI.

Domain	Indicators	Definition	Source	Number of countries covered	Latest year of data
Climate change	INFORM Global Risk index	INFORM is a global, open-source risk assessment for humanitarian crises and disasters.	United Nations	191	2024
Cybersecurity	Cybersecurity Index	The Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) is a survey measure capturing the commitment of Member States to cybersecurity to raise awareness. It is the only open-source cybersecurity index available.	International Telecommunication Union	193	2024
Democratic processes	Participatory Democracy Index	A measure of the extent to which the ideal of participatory democracy is achieved within a country.	VDEM	178	2024
Economic crises	Financial vulnerability – non-performing loans as % of total loans	Non-performing loans to total gross loans ratio is calculated using the value of non-performing loans (NPLs) as the numerator and the total value of the loan portfolio as the denominator. It is often used as a proxy for asset quality.	World Bank	143	2023
	Central government debt, total (% of GDP)	Central government debt, total (% of GDP).	International Monetary Fund	135	2024
Energy insecurity	Energy imports	Energy imports, net (% of energy use). Banded to be 0 if country is a net exporter of energy.	World Bank, Enerdata	187	2023
	Electric power consumption (kWh per capita)	Electric power consumption (kWh per capita)	World Bank	142	2024
Fragile states	Fragile States Index	The Fragile States Index (FSI) is an annual ranking of 178 countries based on the different pressures they face that impact their levels of fragility. The index is based on the Fund for Peace's proprietary Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) analytical approach. Based on comprehensive social science methodology, three primary streams of data – quantitative, qualitative and expert validation – are triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the FSI.	Fund for Peace	178	2024
Crime	Homicide rate per 100 000	Homicide rate per 100 000 – used as a proxy for crime.	UNODC	192	2023
	Perceptions of criminality banded	Responses to the Gallup question: 'Do you feel safe walking alone?'	Gallup	163	2024
Resilience to disinformation	Resilience to disinformation	A measure of how often domestic and foreign governments and political parties use social media and	VDEM	177	2024

Domain	Indicators	Definition	Source	Number of countries covered	Latest year of data
		advertising to spread disinformation within the country.			
Terrorism	Global Terrorism Index	A composite score to provide an ordinal ranking of countries on the impact of terrorism. The impact of terrorism includes incidents, deaths, injuries and property damage caused by terrorism.	Institute for Economics and Peace	163	2024
Violent conflict	Conflict sub-indicators of the Global Peace Index	Worst score of the following indicators from the Global Peace Index: (1) Intensity of internal conflict; (2) Deaths from internal conflict; (3) Number of internal conflicts; (4) Intensity of external conflict; (5) Deaths from external conflict.	Institute for Economics and Peace	163	2024
WMD	Nuclear Threat Index	The Nuclear Threat Index assesses countries' progress on nuclear security, highlights security gaps and recommends action for governments to better protect nuclear materials and facilities and build an effective global nuclear security architecture.	EIU	176	2023

The EU Global Strategy 2016 also discusses the importance of *hybrid threats* in coming years. Hybrid threats are conventional and unconventional, military and non-military activities that can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific political objectives. They can range from cyber-attacks on critical information systems, through to the disruption of critical services, such as energy supplies or financial services, to the undermining of public trust in government institutions or the deepening of social divisions. Given the combined nature of hybrid threats, it is not possible to capture the risk posed to a country in any one measure. By capturing the potential components of hybrid threats in the NI domains, no separate hybrid threat domain is calculated.

5.2. Detailed domain and indicator descriptor

5.2.1. Domain 1 – Climate change

Indicator: INFORM Global Risk Index – Natural Disaster Risk Sub-indicator

Full description: The INFORM Global Risk Index gives an annual per country score between 0 and 10, where 10 is 'very high risk'.

Rationale: INFORM is a global, open-source risk assessment for humanitarian crises and disasters, based on three dimensions of hazard and exposure, vulnerability and lack of coping capacity. It recognises climate change and the risks associated with it as having both natural and man-made components, and the fact that the risk resulting from climate change also depends on how countries are able to cope with the effects of climate change.

Source: INFORM (European Commission, 2019)

URL: http://www.inform-index.org/

5.2.2. Domain 2 – Cybersecurity

Indicator: Global Cybersecurity Index

Full description: The Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) is a measure of the commitment of the member states of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to cybersecurity, assessed along five dimensions: legal measures, technical measures, organisational measures, capacity building, and cooperation.

Rationale: The threat from cybersecurity can only be countered by a systemic and cross-sectoral regulatory approach grounded in technological capabilities. If a country is not currently taking active steps to protect financial and physical infrastructure, and personal or government data, it leaves itself open to attacks. Using the GCI to examine the action and measures a country is taking to try and minimise threats from cyber-attacks is a viable, open-source quantified measure of future threat.

Source: ITU (International Telecommunication Union, 2017)

URL: https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Pages/global-cybersecurity-index.aspx

5.2.3. Domain 3 – Democratic processes

Indicator: Participatory Democracy Index

Full description: The Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) database is a set of country-level indicators of political or governmental organisation, a society or institution with an organised government, the state, and the body politic.

The Participatory Democracy Index used in the NI is a measure of the extent to which the ideal of participatory democracy is achieved within a country.

Rationale: Democratic processes are widely recognised as contributing to peace. Well-functioning democracies themselves have institutions to deal with societal grievances in a non-violent way. It is also believed democracies are less likely to engage in armed conflict with other democracies. Democratic countries on average have the highest levels of peace globally in the Global Peace Index (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019a). Furthermore, with the exception of relatively infrequent 'black swan' political or conflict events, a country's current democratic status tends to be a good predictor of future democratic status.

Source: Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) (University of Gothenburg, 2020)

URL: https://www.v-dem.net

5.2.4. Domain 4 – Economic crises

Indicator: Financial vulnerability – non-performing loans as % of total loans

Full description: Non-performing loans to total gross loans ratio is calculated by using the value of non-performing loans (NPLs) as the numerator and the total value of the loan portfolio as the denominator. It is often used as a proxy for asset quality.

Rationale: Non-performing loans are a good predictor of financial crises, with broader social consequences. Most immediately, high levels of debt may affect the state's ability to provide basic public services, which in turn is a key source of legitimacy for a government. Excess borrowing, particularly external debt, means increased exposure to global market risks and creditor decisions, both of which can

make a state vulnerable to external economic shocks (World Economic Forum and Zurich Insurance Group, 2019). Unsustainable borrowing and debt may exacerbate underlying societal divisions, particularly if real or perceived inequalities grow.

Source: World Bank (World Bank, 2020, Trading Economics, 2021)

URL: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.AST.NPER.ZS

Indicator: General government net debt (% GDP)

Full description: The general government net debt to GDP ratio is calculated using the value of general government net debt as the numerator and total GDP as the denominator.

Rationale: Sovereign debt crises have been found to be correlated with civil unrest (Reinhart, 2010), and some have argued that a sovereign debt crisis followed by extreme austerity measures were a contributing factor to the outbreak of the Second World War in Germany and the genocide in Rwanda.

Source: International Monetary Fund

URL: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2022/April

5.2.5. Domain 5 – Energy insecurity

Indicator: Energy imports

Full description: Energy imports, net (% of energy use).

Rationale: Energy independence, i.e. self-reliance on domestic sources of energy including oil, natural gas, other minerals and clean energy sources, has been a defining component of energy security since at least the oil price crisis of October 1973. Although it is only one aspect of energy security (alongside measures such as source diversity and distance to consumption), it is a measure for which open-source, comparable data exist at a global scale, and is hence minimally sufficient to capture the conceptual threat of energy insecurity.

The IEP has supplemented the World Bank data with more recent data obtained from the Global Energy Statistical Yearbook 2020. This covers 60 countries up to 2019.

Source: World Bank (World Bank, 2020, Enerdata, 2021)

URL: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/eg.imp.cons.zs

https://yearbook.enerdata.net/

Indicator: Electric power consumption (kWh per capita)

Full description: Electric power consumption (kWh per capita)

Rationale: Countries that consume more energy and have high dependence on imports will be more fragile than countries with a different profile.

Source: World Bank (World Bank, 2022)

URL: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.USE.ELEC.KH.PC

5.2.6. Domain 6 – Fragile states

Indicator: Fragile States Index

Full description: A score between 0 and 120, where 120 is the most fragile. Each country is scored annually based on 12 conflict risk indicators grouped into four dimensions: cohesion, economic, political and social.

Rationale: The Fragile States Index is based on a conflict assessment framework – known as CAST – that was developed by the Fund for Peace nearly a quarter of a century ago for assessing the vulnerability of states to collapse. The CAST framework was designed to measure this vulnerability in pre-conflict, active conflict and post-conflict situations, and continues to be used widely by policy-makers, field practitioners and local community networks. The methodology uses both qualitative and quantitative indicators, relies on public source data and produces quantifiable results.

Source: Fund for Peace (Fund for Peace, 2020)

URL: https://fragilestatesindex.org/

5.2.7. Domain 7 – Criminality/Homicide

Indicator: Homicide rate

Full description: Country homicide rate per 100 000 population

Rationale: High homicide rates are associated with high risks to the security of the people within a country and reflect the diminished capacity of government to perform its duties to protect people within its borders.

The EU Global Strategy highlights trans-border crime as a significant potential threat to peace in the world. Transnational organised crime, by its very nature, affects all countries. The nature of trans-border crimes varies greatly, from Class A drug smuggling to human trafficking. Crime recording also varies from country to country, but there is no single database that captures cross-border crimes. While UNODC publishes a 'transnational organised crime threat assessment', these are meant to be applied at the local level and do not provide a platform to create a globally comparative ranking of countries.[30] What is more, the factors which enable trans-border crime also enable other types of economic activity: communications, trade, interconnectedness, globalisation and new technologies.

In the absence of a relative country measure for transnational/trans-border crime, the NI uses a country's homicide rate per 100 000 people as a proxy for levels of crime. While this is a crude measure, the link between homicide and organised crime is widely explored,[31] and it has been used in the literature as an indicator of organised crime in a country.[32]

Source: UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2020)

URL: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistical-activities.html

Indicator: Perceptions of criminality

Full description: Reponses to the Gallup world poll question: 'Do you feel safe walking alone?'

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[30]   United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010.

[31]   United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011.

[32]   Alberto Alesina, 2019.

Rationale: Perceptions of criminality in a society affect citizens' sense of security and identity, with broader implications for businesses, security spending and security policies. Perceptions of high levels of criminality can have a negative impact on the social contract between a government and its population. The IEP has found that the cost of violence containment, which is influenced by perceived threats, is around US$1 800 per person per year (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019).

Source: IEP (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019)

URL: https://visionofhumanity.org

A final country score is calculated by a weighted sum of 0.75 homicide rate + 0.25 perceptions of criminality.

5.2.8. Domain 8 – Resilience to disinformation

Indicator: Resilience to disinformation

Full description: The Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) database has four indicators for the presence of disinformation:

- Government dissemination of false information (domestic): How often do the government and its agents use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence its own population?
- Party dissemination of false information (domestic): How often do major political parties and candidates for office use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence their own population?
- Foreign governments' dissemination of false information: How routinely do foreign governments and their agents use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence domestic politics in this country?
- Foreign governments' ads: How routinely do foreign governments and their agents use paid advertisements on social media in order to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence domestic politics in this country?

Each country is ranked on a Likert scale of (0) 'extremely often' to (4) 'never, or almost never'. The resilience to disinformation indicator used in the NI is the country average of each of these four indicators.

Rationale: There is growing concern over the ability of both state and non-state actors to not only restrict the free flow of information, but also actively interfere in the functioning of civil society through use of disinformation campaigns. Research into resilience to disinformation is a relatively new field of quantification with a number of emerging sources in recent years (Eurasian States in Transition Research Center, 2018; Global Disinformation Index, 2020). The NI will continually monitor the literature to build on these measures in forthcoming releases.

Source: Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) (University of Gothenburg, 2020)

URL: https://www.v-dem.net/

5.2.9. Domain 9 – Terrorism

Indicator: Global Terrorism Index Score

Full description: A composite score that provides a ranking of countries on the impact of terrorism. The impact of terrorism includes incidents, deaths, injuries and hostages caused by terrorism

Rationale: This is a core indicator of the multidimensional impact of terrorism on a country. It is the most reliable and consistent data source, available across more than 163 countries and updated on an annual basis, starting in 2007.

Source: IEP (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2023)

URL: http://www.visionofhumanity.org/

5.2.10. Domain 10 – Violent conflicts

Indicator: Violent conflict

Full description: A composite indicator of the number, intensity and fatalities of both internal and external violent conflicts.

Rationale: In its annual Global Peace Index, the IEP measures the following four indicators relating to violent conflict:

Number and duration of internal conflicts

This indicator measures the number and duration of conflicts that occur within a country's legal boundaries. The information for this indicator is sourced from three datasets from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP): the battle-related deaths dataset, non-state conflict dataset and one-sided violence dataset.

Number of deaths from organised internal conflict

This indicator uses the UCDP's definition of conflict, which is 'a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year'. Statistics are compiled from the most recent edition of the IISS ACD, which has the following definition of armed conflict-related fatalities: 'Fatality statistics relate to military and civilian lives lost as a direct result of an armed conflict'.

Number, duration and role in external conflicts

This indicator measures the number and duration of extraterritorial conflicts a country is involved in. Information for this indicator is sourced from the UCDP battle-related deaths dataset. The score for a country is determined by adding together all individual conflict scores where that country is involved as an actor in a conflict outside its legal boundaries. Conflicts are not counted against a country if they have already been counted in the number and duration of internal conflicts indicator.

Number of deaths from organised external conflict

This indicator uses the UCDP's definition of conflict as 'a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year'. Where no data were provided, several alternative sources have been used: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Armed Conflict Database; the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, and the EIU.

Each of these are scored out of 1 to 5. The NI uses a country's worst score across all of these indicators for the violent conflict domain.

Source: IEP (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019a)

URL: http://www.visionofhumanity.org/

5.2.11. Domain 11 – Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

Indicator: Nuclear and Heavy Weapons Capabilities Indicator

Full description: The Global Peace Index Nuclear and Heavy Weapons Capabilities Score (HWC) is a categorised system for rating the destructive capability of a country's stock of heavy weapons. The stocks are those of government forces and do not include armed opposition groups' holdings. Heavy weapons numbers were determined using a combination of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Countries are given a score of 1 for low military capabilities. Nuclear countries are scored 5.

Rationale: This indicator is a categorised system for rating the destructive capability of a country's stock of heavy weapons.

Source: IEP (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019a)

URL: http://www.visionofhumanity.org/

Indicator: Nuclear Threat Index

Full description: The Nuclear Threat Index assesses countries' progress on nuclear security, highlights security gaps and recommends actions for governments to better protect nuclear materials and facilities and build an effective global nuclear security architecture.

The Normandy Index score is calculated by using the minimum country score in the following three indicators:

4   Nuclear threat 1: scores for 22 countries with 1 kg or more of weapons-useable nuclear materials;
5   Nuclear threat 2: scores for 153 countries and Taiwan with <1 kg of weapons-useable nuclear materials;
6   Nuclear sabotage: 46 countries and Taiwan with nuclear facilities including power plants and research reactors with a capacity >2 MW.

To capture the potential consequences or tensions posed by a country owing to neighbouring or regional countries' nuclear threat, the NI also calculates a country score that incorporates the average regional score.

A final country score is calculated by a weighted sum of 0.75 country score + 0.25 regional score.

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit

URL: https://www.ntiindex.org/

5.2.12. Data availability and imputation

The methodology developed has been designed to be in line with other prominent global indicators, and substantial effort has been made to populate the index with the best existing country information. However, the major challenge to developing a harmonised composite index is in attempting to overcome the paucity of consistent and comprehensive data across very diverse countries around the world. They vary significantly not just in terms of demographic and geographic characteristics, but also in terms of socio-economic characteristics which can often impact data collection and quality.

The issue of data gaps is a common challenge to creating an index. The OECD recommend a number of statistical techniques for dealing with data imputation to fill in data gaps. Table 2 lists the approaches

used in the NI. Using the combination of these techniques, the NI represents the use of the best possible data without an overly complex methodology.

Table 2: Data imputation methods

Method	Description	Application in NI
Cold deck imputation	Replacing the missing value with a value from another source.	The NI uses this either when it uses the most recent data point in a series as the current data point, or uses additional country statistics to fill in gaps.
Hot deck imputation	Replacing the missing value with a regional average.	The NI uses hot deck imputation for data that is not available for all countries.

5.3. Weighting the indicators

As the EU Global Strategy 2018 does not rank domains in order of priority, the NI uses an *equal weight of 1* across all domains, simplifying the calculation of the final NI score.

The only NI domain with more than one indicator is that of *crime*, which includes *intentional homicides (per 100 000 people) and perceptions of criminality banded* weighted at 0.75 and 0.25 respectively.

5.4. Domain calculations

This section illustrates how each indicator, and hence each domain is dealt with. The domain process has two stages: 1) data collection and 2) imputation and banding.

Banding data in the case of the NI is a way of dealing with comparing otherwise incongruous information. It takes each indicator and scales them to a score between 0 and 1 relative to the whole dataset. To do this, appropriate minimum and maximum values for the dataset are decided such that anything below the minimum is assigned 0, anything above the maximum is assigned 1, and everything else is scaled evenly between the two. Therefore, in year *y*, after data imputation, the banded score is calculated for indicator *i* by equation 1.

Equation 1: Banding equation

$$Banded_i = \frac{Country\ Indicator\ Value\ in\ Year\ y_i - mininum\ cutoff_i}{maximum\ cutoff_i - mininum\ cutoff_i}$$

Banding this way indicates the implicit assumption that higher levels of the indicator are better. However, higher levels of some indicators, such as the Global Terrorism Index score, represent a less desirable case for countries. In such cases, the banded score is reversed and calculated by equation 2.

Equation 2: Reverse banding equation

$$Reverse\ Banded_i = 1 - \frac{Country\ Indicator\ Value\ in\ Year\ y_i - mininum\ cutoff_i}{maximum\ cutoff_i - mininum\ cutoff_i}$$

The banded indicator score for each country is then the domain score, as each domain is measured by only one indicator. Each domain score lies between 0 and 1.

An integral part of this process is to set appropriate minimum and maximum cut-off values for the banded scores. There are empirical and normative methods available for doing this. While some data may be

distributed normally and therefore lend itself well to standard and well-defined mathematical techniques, such as defining outliers as those greater than three standard deviations from the mean, other datasets do not follow well-behaved trends. The final choice of which technique is used must depend on a number of considerations: the nature of the data, the underlying distribution, the purpose of the index, what information is being conveyed, etc. Upon investigation of the global datasets used in the NI, very few of the distributions can be classified as normal. The presence of outliers affects not only the average, but the variance, skewing both the minimum and maximum.

To account for this, IEP in some instances set artificial minimums and maximums to ensure results are not too heavily influenced by outliers. In cases where outliers are present, the lower bound set for the banding process is the lowest data point that is within 1.5 times the interquartile range below the first quartile (where the interquartile range is defined as the distance between the first and third quartiles). Similarly, the upper bound set for the banding process is the largest data point that is within 1.5 times the interquartile range above the third quartile.

5.5. Aggregating domain scores to final NI score

Since each domain is weighted equally in terms of threat significance, the final aggregated NI score can be calculated as the average of the eleven domain scores. Thus, the final NI score is a value between 0 and 10 for each country in each year.

$$NI\ Score = 11 \times \frac{\sum_{i=D1}^{D11} Country\ Indicator\ Banded\ Score_i}{11}$$

5.5.1. Bibliography

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In the context of the wars in Ukraine and other parts of the world, the increasingly global effects – material and political – of war make it more important than ever to measure the level of threats to peace, security and democracy around the world. The Normandy Index has presented an annual measurement of these threats since the 2019 Normandy Peace Forum. The results of the 2025 exercise suggest the level of threats to peace is at its highest since the index was launched, confirming declining trends in global security resulting from conflict, geopolitical rivalry, growing militarisation and hybrid threats. The findings of the 2025 exercise draw on data compiled in 2024 and 2025 to compare peace – defined on the basis of a given country's performance against a range of predetermined threats – across countries and regions. Derived from the Index, 63 individual country case studies provide a picture of the state of peace in the world today.

Designed and prepared by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), in conjunction with, and on the basis of data provided by, the Institute for Economics and Peace, the Normandy Index is produced in partnership with the Region of Normandy.

The paper forms part of the EPRS contribution to the 2026 Normandy World Peace Forum.