The war that erupted after the attack on 7 October 2023 profoundly reshaped the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, causing hundreds of thousands of casualties and reducing Gaza to ruins. In response, the plan promoted by Donald Trump and supported by a Security Council resolution promises a ceasefire and a political transition. 

On the ground, the facts highlight the gap between rhetoric and reality. The question then is whether this peace plan is viable and what a comprehensive resolution of the conflict might look like.

Partner’s description:

The Collège des Bernardins is pleased to announce a round-table discussion on possible avenues for resolving and managing the Israel-Palestine conflict, at a time when the US administration has decided to launch the second phase of the peace plan adopted in November 2025. The 2025 peace plan proposed by the Trump administration aims to bring an end to the long-running conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza through a 20-point roadmap[1], including a ceasefire, the demilitarisation of Gaza, technocratic governance and the reconstruction of the territory; it also provided for the exchange of prisoners and the return of all hostages as preconditions for the withdrawal of forces and the resumption of civilian life. 

This plan was formally approved by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 in November 2025, with the aim of deploying an international stabilisation force and supporting a national committee to administer Gaza. In January 2026, with the transition to phase II of the plan, the focus shifted to the demilitarisation of Hamas, increased humanitarian support and the launch of reconstruction mechanisms. 

At the World Economic Forum in Davos (January 2026), Donald Trump signed the founding charter of a ‘Board of Peace’ intended to oversee the implementation of this second phase and, more broadly, peace and reconstruction efforts.  This Board, led by Trump and comprising a number of international leaders, has the stated mission of coordinating funding, stabilisation and reconstruction, although several European countries, such as France and the United Kingdom, have refused to join, fearing an encroachment on the UN’s role.  

The Peace Council therefore now fulfils a dual role: implementing the commitments of Phase II in Gaza and providing a multilateral platform to address wider conflict zones, beyond the Israeli-Palestinian conflict alone. The transformation of the Gaza Strip — for example, through ambitious urban and infrastructure development projects — continues to be presented as a means of achieving lasting peace, although these visions raise questions regarding their feasibility and local acceptance.

On the ground, despite this political and diplomatic framework, ceasefire violations and security tensions persist, highlighting the gap between policy statements and everyday reality. It is therefore necessary to question the viability of this peace plan for a two-state solution. It is also worth considering what a comprehensive resolution of the conflict might entail, including aspects of education, international justice and the de-sacralisation of rhetoric.

This meeting aims to shed light on the diplomatic, humanitarian, security and educational options offered by this peace plan, and also to examine possible alternatives (such as the armistice plan proposed by the Palestinian Technical Working Group and the draft ‘comprehensive resolution of the conflict’ put forward by the Collège des Bernardins).